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ARTICLES
ARTICLE III AND SUPRANATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
Henry Paul Monaghan*
With the rise of supranationallegislative bodies, the use of supranational adjudicatory bodies has also increased. These adjudicatory bodies
have even been allowed to review the domestic law decisions offederal administrative agencies, and their decisions are insulatedfrom any review by Article III courts. These developments have been met by intense opposition. This
Article addresses the question whether, as claimed by several writers, the
emerging supranational adjudicatory order impermissibly contravenes the
"essentialattributesof the judicialpower established by Article III." Examining two case studies, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and the Supreme Court's recent decisions regardingArticle 36 of the Vienna
Convention, ProfessorMonaghan concludes that (generally at least) supranationaljudicial review does not run afoul of Article III. He draws upon
the historicalpractice of allowing binational panels (BNPs) to adjudicate
claims by Americans againstforeign sovereigns that stretches back to the earliest days of the Founding, beginning with the Jay Treaty. Indeed, in the
periodfollowing the Civil War, BNPs even "reviewed" decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. With respect to the constitutionality of supranational
tribunals expounding treaty obligations, Professor Monaghan argues that
these tribunals are fully competent to determine these obligations, and, at
least in the trade area,fit well within the "public rights" doctrine, which has
played an important role in the rise of the administrative state. Professor
Monaghan concludes that based on historicalpractice and current doctrine,
Article III, standing alone, poses no substantial barrier to supranational
judicial review.
I.

SUPRANATIONAL ADJUDICATORY TRIBUNALS AND THEIR CRITICS

Surprised? Yes, indeed: "To say I was surprised to hear [at a dinner
party] that a judgment of this court [the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts] was being subjected to further review would be an understatement." So stated Chief Justice Margaret Marshall in her telephone
interview with New York Times reporter Adam Liptak for his newspaper
* Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University. The
author expresses great thanks to Bill Katt and Suzanne Bermann, and to his editor Leanne
Wilson. Very special thanks to Thomas Lee.
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article, Review of U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries.1 The Chief
Justice was referring to Mondev InternationalLtd. v. United States,2 which
ultimately rejected a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)based challenge to the SupremeJudicial Court's decision in Lafayette Place
3
Associates v. Boston Redevelopment Authority.
NAFTA, an accord among the United States and its leading trade
partners, Canada and Mexico, 4 is designed to open the domestic markets
of the signatory nations. Toward that end, Chapter 11 of NAFTA provides various substantive safeguards to foreign investors, such as equality
of treatment and protection against uncompensated expropriation. 5
1. Adam Liptak, Review of U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 18, 2004, § 1, at 20.
2. 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 181 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002).
3. 694 N.E.2d 820 (Mass. 1998).
4. North American Free Trade Agreement (pts. 1 & 2), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 & 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
5. Id. art. 1102 (providing equality with local investors); id. art. 1110 (prohibiting
direct or indirect expropriation of an investment except in accordance with certain
conditions and "on payment of compensation"). In Metalclad Corp. v. UnitedMexican States,
a Chapter 11 panel gave an expanded conception of the protection against
uncompensated expropriation. 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 209, 230-31 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.Trib.
2000). This ruling, which involved actions taken by Mexico to keep Metalclad (a U.S.
corporation) from operating a hazardous waste landfill it had constructed, has upset
environmentalists. See Danielle Knight, Mexico Ordered to Pay U.S. Company 17 Million
Dollars, Inter Press Serv., Aug. 31, 2000, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
socecon/envronmt/nafta.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting Dan
Seligman, director of Sierra Club's sustainable trade campaign, describing Metalclad
decision as "a nightmare"); see also Chris Tollefson, Metalclad v. United Mexican States
Revisited: Judicial Oversight of NAFTA's Chapter Eleven Investor-State Claim Process, 11
Minn. J. Global Trade 183, 184 (2002) (describing media reaction to Metalclad as "a
foreboding illustration of the implications of free trade and globalization for local
governance and environmental regulation").
But the panel's decision was not the end of the matter. Mexico sought review of the
award in annulment proceedings at the seat of arbitration-in this case, British Columbia,
Canada. The Supreme Court of British Columbia reviewed the arbitral award by applying
the standard of review set forth in British Columbia's International Commercial
Arbitration Act and implied in the process that the answer to whether the reviewing court
could review the conclusions of law made by the NAFTA Tribunal was determined solely by
reference to applicable domestic law. See United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp.,
[2001] 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359, 371-73 (B.C. Sup. Ct., Can.) (considering which of two British
Columbia statutes should determine standard of review and applying R.S.B.C. ch. 233
(B.C., Can. 1996)). In the end, the court upheld the tribunal's decision with respect to the
Article 1110 claim, though it did overturn other aspects of the decision. Id. at 395-96
(overturning two of three questions of law submitted to NAFTA Tribunal and setting aside
Metalclad award's calculation of interest); see also Anthony DePalma, Judge Issues Split
Decision in NAFTA Rules Case, N.Y. Times, May 4, 2001, at WI (describing decision of B.C.
Judge Tysoe as rejecting transparency requirements imposed by NAFTA Tribunal). For a
more detailed discussion of the use of annulment proceedings to review Chapter 11
arbitration awards, see generally Charles H. Brower I1,Investor-State Disputes Under
NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 43 (2001). For a criticism of
the use of annulment proceedings, see David A. Gantz, Reconciling Environmental
Protection and Investor Rights Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, [2001] 31 Envtl. L. Rep.
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More importantly here, foreign investors are also generally protected
against denials of justice such as denial of equal treatment and denial of
6
due process.
As implemented by the North American Free Trade Implementation
Act, 7 Chapter 11 provides for a binational investor-state dispute arbitration mechanism (binational panel, or BNP) to adjudicate alleged Chapter 11 violations.8 In Mondev InternationalLtd. v. United States, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court had rejected state law contract- and tortbased claims by a Canadian investor arising out of an urban renewal project in Boston.9 Instituting Chapter 11 proceedings against the United
States, the investor argued that the state court decision itself had so far
departed from that court's prior decisions that it amounted to a "denial
of justice" under Article 1105(1).l ° Accepting the liability theory asserted, the NAFTA panel rejected the challenge on the merits."1
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, by contrast, sustained such a challenge. 1 2 There, a Canadian company challenged the largestjury award in
Mississippi's legal history: a four hundred million dollar punitive damage
award against the company in a simple breach of contract dispute worth
no more than ten million dollars on the merits.1 3 A distinguished
10,646, 10,667 (Envtl. Law Inst.) (describing this method of challenging NAFTA decisions
as "short-sighted in the medium and long term").
6. NAFTA, supra note 4, arts. 1115-1116. The classic work on denial ofjustice claims
is Alwyn V. Freeman, The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice
(1938). The basic idea of denial of justice is that if a country denies a foreigner adequate
judicial process in its own courts, his sovereign could assert a denial of justice claim at
international law. Id. at 1. Under traditional principles of international law, the claim
might be vindicated by war, diplomacy, or arbitration. The international legal concept of
denial ofjustice has never been clearly articulated, although it resonates with due process
on the domestic level. For an excellent discussion of denial ofjustice claims located within
a larger historical framework, see generally Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State
Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of Justice Claims, 45 Va. J. Int'l L. 809
(2005). Professor Bjorklund discussesJan Paulsson, Denial ofJustice in International Law
(2005), throughout her article.
7. Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.).
8. State-foreign investor arbitration has long been available under the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States art.
36, Aug. 17, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, but no such proceeding has been
brought against the United States.
9. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 181, 193 (NAFIA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib. 2002). For a good description of the Mondev proceedings, see Ernest A. Young,
Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 Duke L.J. 1143, 1170-77
(2005); see also Bjorklund, supra note 6, at 849-52.
10. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1105(1); Mondev, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) at 217-18.
11. Mondev, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) at 226-34; see also Young, supra note 9, at 1172-73
(summarizing Mondev decision).
12. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) 421, 464 (NAFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib. 2003).
13. Id. at 442. When the state courts refused to waive an appeal bond requirement of
one and one quarter the amount of the judgment, Loewen Group settled the lawsuit for
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NAFTA pane 1 4 characterized the trial proceeding as a "miscarriage of
justice" 15 and "the antithesis of due process." 16 The trial judge, the panel
said, had "failed in his duty to take control of the trial by permitting the
jury to be exposed to persistent and flagrant appeals to prejudice." 17 The
result was a clear denial ofjustice, the panel concluded.' 8 On procedural
grounds, however, the panel held that no NAFTA violation had been
established.19
Although Chapter 11 scrutiny of United States judicial proceedings
has thus far produced no concrete adverse results, 20 Chief Justice
Marshall's intuitive misgivings are widely shared. 2 1 "There are grave implications here," said the chief justice of the California Supreme Court,
"[i]t's rather shocking that the highest courts of the state and federal
governments could have their judgments circumvented by these tribunals. '22 Judge Mikva, a former congressman and a member of the threejudge panel, agreed: "If Congress had known that there was anything like
this in NAFTA... they would never have voted for it."23 A great deal is at
stake, Professor Peter Spiro informs us: "[I] t points to a fundamental
reorientation of our constitutional system. You have an international tri24
bunal essentially reviewing American court judgments."
$175 million and then commenced a Chapter 11 proceeding. Id. at 442-43; see also
Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National
Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2029, 2038-39 (2004) (discussing facts of Loewen suit).
14. The panel consisted of former District of Columbia circuitjudge Abner Mikva, Sir
Anthony Mason, a former chiefjustice of the High Court of Australia, and Lord Mustill, a
former British law lord. Loewen, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) at 421.
15. Id. at 451.
16. Id. at 464.
17. Id. at 450.
18. Id. at 467-68.
19. Loewen Group had failed to exhaust its domestic remedies prior to invoking the
Chapter 11 procedure. Id. at 484.
20. "The United States has yet to lose any investor-state case." Bjorklund, supra note
6, at 889 n.328.
21. Interestingly, in other contexts Chief Justice Marshall had been strongly
supportive of paying heed to foreign tribunals. Ahdieh, supra note 13, at 2033 n.8 (citing
Margaret H. Marshall, "Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from Their Children":
Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1633
(2004)).
22. Liptak, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chief Justice
Ronald M. George of the Supreme Court of California). Loewen Group's American lawyer
also expressed unease. "I agree with the principle that people should not short-circuit or
second-guess the American legal system .... But this case was so extreme that hopefully it
will never happen again." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting John H. Lewis
Jr.).
23. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When asked about Chapter 11, Senator
John Kerry's response shows that Congress was unaware of the full implications of the
chapter: "When we debated NAFTA . . . not a single word was uttered in discussing
Chapter 11. Why? Because we didn't know how this provision would play out. No one
really knew just how high the stakes would get." Id.
24. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Chapter 19 of NAFFA provides, at first blush, an even more striking
example of the substitution of supranational for domestic dispute resolution. Chapter 19 BNPs (a) directly apply domestic American legal standards, and (b) issue orders directly binding federal administrative officials without a right of appeal to federal courts. 25 American import law
has long regulated "dumping" (sales below a "fair" price) and "unfair"
foreign governmental subsidies. 2 6 Both are subject to administrative penalties when, after a hearing, they are determined to threaten material injury in the United States. 27 These proceedings may be triggered by a very
wide range of "interested parties" (e.g., domestic competitors).28 Judicial
review of these antidumping/countervailing duty (AD/CVD) determinations is available in the United States Court of International Trade and
thence in the Federal Circuit, both Article III tribunals. 29 Review is
under the standard provided by section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 30 While Chapter 19 preserves application of American antidumping and countervailing duty laws,3 1 it effectively substitutes BNP
32
review for that of Article III courts.
25. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904. For a comprehensive description of Chapter 19
in the American courts, see Judge Pogue's opinion in Ontario Forest Industries Ass'n v.
United States, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1311-16 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006).
26. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2000) (mandating duty imposition to offset subsidies on
products imported into United States); id. § 1673 (same, with respect to dumping).
27. The Department of Commerce determines the issue of fair price or impermissible
subsidy, and the United States International Trade Commission determines the issue of
material injury. Id. §§ 1671, 1673, 1677(1).
28. Id. § 1677(9).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000).
30. See, e.g., Consol. Bearings Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir.
2005) ("In reviewing decisions by the Court of International Trade . . .we apply the
standard of review set forth in the APA and will 'hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.'" (second omission in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2) (2000))).
31. Each signatory "reserves the right to apply its antidumping law and countervailing
duty law to goods imported from the territory of any other Party." NAFTA, supra note 4,
art. 1902(1).
32. Id. art. 1904(2) ("An involved Party may request that a panel review, based on the
administrative record, a final antidumping or countervailing duty determination of a
competent investigating authority of an importing Party to determine whether such
determination was in accordance with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the
importing Party."); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (5) (B) (2000) (requiring party seeking
BNP review to file notice of review with NAFTA Secretariat within thirty days of decision).
The implementing statute also expressly exempts Chapter 19 subject matter from the
otherwise typically exclusive jurisdictional grants to the U.S. Court of International Trade.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (i). For a description of the relationship between domestic review and
the BNP, see Ontario Forest Industries Ass'n v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1309,
1311-16 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006).
In July of 2005, the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario, Canada rejected a Canadianlaw based challenge to Chapter 19. See Council of Canadians v. Canada (AG), [2005]
Carswell Ont. 2973 (Ont. Super. Ct. of Justice, Can.), available at 2005 WL 1594597, affd
[2006] 217 O.A.C. 316 (Ont. Ct. App., Can.).
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Chapter 19 proceedings are state-state, not investor-state proceedings. 33 Unlike Chapter 11 proceedings, which can be brought by private
parties,3 4 in Chapter 19 proceedings private parties must follow the ancient practice and persuade their states to "espouse" their claims.3 5 Once
a state decides (as a matter of discretion) to take up the private law claims
of its nationals, the state itself becomes the claimant, and no other state
may question its decision to espouse. 36 Arbitration awards from espoused
claims do not create vested rights in the American claimants so
long as the funds or property remain in the possession of the government.3 7 Unlike Chapter 11 panels, Chapter 19 panels are directed
to apply domestic U.S. (not NAFTA) legal standards to determine
38
whether the federal administrative decision should be sustained.
Moreover, United States administrative officials must comply with
the BNP decision: "The panel may uphold a final determination, or
39
remand it for action not inconsistent with the panel's decision."
33. See Ont. Forest Indus., 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1313 (naming NAFTA signatories as
parties" to Chapter 19 disputes). But interested private parties are entitled to participate
in the arbitration. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(7).
34. Chapter 11 breaks from the practice of requiring state espousal to initiate the BNP
process. See Bjorklund, supra note 6, at 825 (noting that NAFTA "granted individual
rights to alien investors," eliminating need for espousal); infra text accompanying notes
255-256.
35. This practice is described in Frelinghuysen v. Key, 110 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1884). For
an excellent account of the history of espousal law, see Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme
Court of the United States as Quasi-International Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court's
Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against States,
104 Colum. L. Rev. 1765, 1783, 1855-60, 1862-66 (2004) [hereinafter Lee, Original
Jurisdiction]. For a briefer description of the historical origin of espousal, even with
respect to claims under the lex mercatoria, see Thomas H. Lee, International Law,
International Relations Theory, and Preemptive War: The Vitality of Sovereign Equality
Today, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 2004, at 147, 152-53.
36. See New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90 (1883) ("There is no doubt but
one nation may, if it sees fit, demand of another nation the payment of a debt owing by the
latter to a citizen of the former."). This decision rejected application of espousal theory to
suits by American states on behalf of their citizens against American states because
historically espousal was linked to "the national powers of levying war and making treaties,"
which the American states had surrendered against one another. Id.; cf. Lee, Original
Jurisdiction, supra note 35, at 1862-66 (discussing New Hampshire v. Louisiana decision).
37. See La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 459-60 (1899)
(holding that Congress or President could choose how to disperse funds or property
gained through espousal).
38. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(2).
39. Id. art. 1904(8). 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g) (7) (A) (2000) implements this provision:
Federal officials "shall, within the period specified by the panel or [appeals] committee,
take action not inconsistent with the decision." Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, International
Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1557,
1575-77 (2003) (criticizing NAFTA for vesting international panels with power to apply
U.S. law in reviewing accuracy of U.S. government agency AD/CVD determinations). For
a discussion of the formalization of AD/CVD determinations, see Peter D. Ehrenhaft, The
"Judicialization" of Trade Law, 56 Notre Dame L. Rev. 595, 601-03, 606-09 (1981).
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BNP decisions
courts.

40

are not subject to further

review

in Article

III

Federal judicial review is unconstitutionally "outsourced," claimed
the petitioner in the Fair Lumber Imports litigation, which challenged
Chapter 19 panels on a broad range of constitutional grounds, including
delegation, due process, and the Appointments Clause. 4 1 Underpinning
most of its claims, the petitioner insisted that:
[T]he provisions challenged here are unprecedented. Never
before has Congress replaced American courts with an international body granted the unreviewable power authoritatively to
construe U.S. law, and to bind high-ranking Executive officials
as a matter of domestic law, in connection42with claims brought by
U.S. companies against their own government.
NAFTA is but one example of the growing importance of international and regional dispute resolution. In American law, that development has been particularly intensified in the trade area by the rapid
emergence of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with its resolution
of state-state trade disputes through arbitration panels and an internal
appeals process, 4 and by various U.S.-negotiated regional trade agreements, such as the United States-Dominican Republic-Central America
44
Free Trade Agreement.
40. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(1) ("[E]ach Party shall replace judicial review
of final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations with binational panel
review."); see also id. art. 1904(11) ("A final determination shall not be reviewed under any
judicial review procedures of the importing Party if an involved Party requests a panel with
respect to that determination.
.
These provisions are implemented by 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(g) (2) (A)-(B).
41. Coal. for Fair Lumber Imports, Exec. Comm. v. United States, 471 F.3d 1329 (D.C.
Cir. 2006). The proceeding was a challenge to the constitutionality of the NAFTA
Implementation Act. See Complaint and Petition for Review for Declaratory Relief at 2,
Fair Lumber Imports, 471 F.3d 1329 (No. 05-1366) [hereinafter Complaint, Fair Lumber
Imports]. The Coalition attempted to continue with its claim for declaratory relief even
though the United States and Canadian governments settled the long-running dispute over
Canadian softwood lumber imports that served as the basis for the Coalition's challenge to
Chapter 19. See Ian Austen & Clifford Krauss, U.S. Will Lift a Lumber Duty in a Trade
Deal with Canada, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 2006, at A6. On December 12, 2006, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that whether or not the settlement rendered the
case moot, it had deprived the court of statutory jurisdiction. FairLumber Imports, 471 F.3d
at 1332.
42. Reply Brief of Petitioner Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports Executive Committee
at 1, FairLumber Imports, 471 F.3d 1329 (No. 05-1366) [hereinafter Reply Brief, FairLumber
Imports] (emphasis added). But see infra Part III (describing this historical practice).
43. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Understanding]. The WTO dispute resolution
mechanism is carefully described in Suzanne Bermann, Note, EC-Hormones and the Case
for an Express WTO Postretaliation Procedure, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 131, 135-38 (2007).
44. Chapter 20 of the US-DR-CAFTA provides for resolution of treaty disputes in a
manner similar to that set forth in the WTO. See Dominican Republic-Central America-
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Quickening patterns of supranational adjudication, of course, far
outrun the trade area. "In the last few years, international dispute resolu'45
tion has assumed unprecedented prominence in international politics.
And unsurprisingly, the new adjudicatory order has come under sustained attack at home. Judge Bork, for example, views it as a platform for
"the agenda of the liberal left or New Class," an agenda that "contains a
toxic measure of anti-Americanism." 46 Indeed, even in the area of international trade, Patti Goldman decries the displacement of domestic institutions "by trade bureaucrats... adjudicating disputes thousands of miles
away." 4 7 ProfessorJed Rubenfeld characterizes NAFTA and WTO panels
as a "threat to [American] self government."48 These objections are, of
course, significantly fueled by the intense opposition to a parallel and, I
believe, far more significant development: the rise of supranational "legislative" bodies. 49 Underpinning all of these objections are fears of "un51
democratic" lawmaking 50 and a loss of national sovereignty.
United States Free Trade Agreement ch. 20, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr
.gov/Trade.Agreements/Bilateral/CAFrA/CAFTA-DRFinal Texts/SectionIndex.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). The agreement has not yet entered into force, as it
must be approved by all signatories. The United States, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Nicaragua have approved the agreement, with parliamentary votes pending in the
remaining two member countries, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. See
Bilaterals.Org, US-DR-CAFTA, at http://www.bilaterals.org/rubrique.php3?id-rubrique=
13 (last updated July 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
45. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals,
93 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2005); see also Ahdieh, supra note 13, at 2031 ("In recent years, a wave
of international judicialization has washed over the globe.").
46. Robert H. Bork, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule ofJudges 10 (2003). For a
concise description of the new institutions and their development, see Posner & Yoo, supra
note 45, at 8-12.
47. Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade
Policy, 27 Cornell Int'l L.J. 631, 633 (1994).
48. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1971, 2025
(2004).
49. The new legislative institutions are a far cry from the international order familiar
to the Founding generation-a world of alliances and trade agreements, but of only
rudimentary or nonexistent international or multinational institutions that independently
formulated binding international norms.
50. Professor Jeremy Rabkin, an American "unilateralist" avowedly hostile to
supranational institutions wielding legislative power, puts this objection thus: "On the
premises of global governance, 'we' are little different from 'them' . .... [T] he whole logic
of global governance subverts the claim of a legislature to make its own decisions for its
own constituents." Jeremy A. Rabkin, Law Without Nations? Why Constitutional
Government Requires Sovereign States 42-43 (2005); see also Robert F. Housman,
Democratizing International Trade Decision-Making, 27 Cornell Int'l L.J. 699, 710-11
(1994) (describing GATT and arguing that it "determine[s] the validity of vital domestic
policies in an undemocratic manner").
51. Professor Rabkin denies that there can or should be much development of
international nonfree-trade norms outside the framework of nation-state sovereignty.
Rabkin, supra note 50, at 236-58. His criticism of the "surrender" of national sovereignty
to international bodies is echoed by others. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at
the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 Yale L.J. 1490, 1497-511
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That fundamental and far-reaching change is occurring in the American legal order with the rise of a supranational legal order may be conceded. 5 2 And the desirability of these developments may be debated.
But do these changes, at least so far as they concern supranational adjudication, portend fundamental changes in the American constitutional order?53 Favorably commenting upon the recognition ofjudgments of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), Justice O'Connor cautioned that:
[T] he vesting of certain adjudicatory authority in international
tribunals presents a very significant constitutional question in
the United States. Article III of our Constitution reserves to federal courts the power to decide cases and controversies, and the
U.S. Congress may not delegate 54
to another tribunal "the essential attributes of judicial power."

(2006) (describing developments and summarizing criticisms); cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter,
A New World Order (2004) (describing changes while defending a normative view that
prefers transnational institutions to "global" institutions); Bjorklund, supra note 6, at 817
("Fears about abdication of sovereignty to international tribunals... reveal[ ] an abiding
distrust in domestic political institutions and democracy."); Kenneth Anderson, Squaring
the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global Government
Networks, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1255 (2005) (reviewing Slaughter, supra) (arguing that
Slaughter's proposal "fails to preserve democracy and democratic accountability"). For an
illuminating account, see Jos6 E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers 616
(2005) ("[T]he Westphalian conception of sovereignty has ... been radically altered by
[international organizations (lOs)] .... [T] he single greatest determinant of sovereignty
today is probably . . . the status of states, as determined by the degree to which they
participate in 1Os and are able to take advantage of their privileges."). Professor Resnik
notes that there are in fact multiple points of entry for foreign legal conceptions and upon
entry the conceptions become absorbed as American law. Judith Resnik, Law's Migration:
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115
Yale L.J. 1564 (2006).
52. Some aspects of the these developments surely involve systemic governmental
changes, particularly so with respect to the "delegations" of U.S. legislative power to
international, regional, and nongovernmental institutions. For an extensive review of the
emerging transnational legal institutions created by these developments and the resulting
delegation by Congress of norm-setting authority to these institutions, see generally David
Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, andJudicial
Authority, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1697 (2003); Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of
International Delegations, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1492 (2004).
53. This has become a topic of increasing academic interest. See, e.g., James E.
Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States,
118 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 766-68 (2004) ("NAFTA panels should not be considered Article I
tribunals that bring into play the elaborate jurisprudence of Article III superiority.");
Matthew Burton, Note, Assigning the Judicial Power to International Tribunals: NAFTA
Binational Panels and Foreign Affairs Flexibility, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1529, 1532 (2002)
(proposing that NAFTA can be "grounded in separation of powers 'flexibility' unique to
the foreign affairs area").
54. Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 35,
42 (1995) (quoting from opinion she authored in Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)). These were remarks made at a
conference and subsequently published.
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And, of course, the very highest of these "essential attributes" is the
'55
Marbuy-basedjudicial duty "to say what the law is."
Like others, Justice O'Connor expresses the feelings of unease that
are invariably created by rapid change. But what happens when that
mood is examined? Commentators who welcome the emerging legal developments are dism~ssive of, or at least impatient with, inquiries that
question the legitimacy of these developments. The question nonetheless persists: Does the "ancient Constitution" of 1789, particularly its
Third Article, and of 1791, particularly its Due Process Clause, impose
any real limits upon the new, wholly unanticipated, supranational adjudi56
catory developments?
This Article submits that NAFTA-like trade tribunals raise no serious
57
problems under Article III and are sanctioned by an ancient lineage.
They are only a recent instantiation of an age-old practice: the use of
arbitration to resolve disputes by American nationals against foreign
states and their nationals. More generally, I believe that any difficulties
created by the Constitution for the emerging adjudicatory order will
prove to be rather small beer. While in the beginning of our constitutional history it was quite possible to claim that Our Federalism invested
our national government with less legal authority in the international
sphere than that possessed by other nation-states, 58 any such conception
has no purchase now. Indeed, the Court insists that the national govern59
ment possesses an apparently freestanding "foreign affairs" power.
55. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). "[N]o power is more
clearly conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States, than the power of this
court to decide, ultimately and finally, all cases arising under such Constitution and laws."
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 525 (1859).
56. Even commentators as perceptive as Professor Bjorklund do not address these
issues. See Bjorklund, supra note 6.
57. Elsewhere in the Constitution there may be external (i.e., non-Article III)
constitutional provisions that limit supranational review of U.S. decisions, but these issues
are beyond the scope of this Article.
58. Professor Cleveland writes:
The U.S. Supreme Court early recognized ... that the specific sovereign powers
actually held by any particular state were determined by that state's domestic law,
which might modify, or deny altogether, the powers otherwise bestowed by
international law. Thus, answering the question of what international law allowed
did not resolve what the Constitution allowed or required. The Constitution
could deny the international power to the national government by reserving it to
the states, or even withhold the power from both levels of government by
reserving it to the people.
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 15-16
(2002) [hereinafter Cleveland, Origins] (footnote omitted).
59. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) ("Although the
source of the President's power to act in foreign affairs does not enjoy any textual detail,
the historical gloss on the 'executive Power' vested in Article II of the Constitution has
recognized the President's 'vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign
relations.'" (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring))); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
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That being the case, and assuming here the general validity of supranational
lawmaking,60 it seems unlikely that the Court will understand the Constitution to seriously impede the manner by which supranational disputes
are resolved. As Duncan Hollis observes, "[s] tates have a long history of
using treaties not only to set out legal norms, but also to authorize extranational actors to interpret and apply treaties in specific cases involving
61
specific parties."
Part II shows that American courts have had a long history of enforcing international legal norms, but in so doing they have generally determined the content of that law for themselves, as well as its domestic consequences. And the powerful grip on the judicial mind of Marbury's
judicial duty "to say what the law is" was most recently in evidence in
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,62 a case interpreting domestic duties under the
Vienna Convention. Part III shows, however, that historical practice-in
which claims of American nationals against foreign states have been subject to resolution by international arbitration-dates back to the Jay
Treaty. Indeed, following the Civil War, Supreme Court decisions were
"reexamined" by such tribunals. Part IV locates this longstanding arbitration history within the larger framework of the American doctrine of public rights, which has played an important role in American domestic law,
allowing the adjudication of claims in whole or part outside the framework of Article III courts. 63 Part V looks again at NAFTA BNPs and
Sanchez-Llamas; regarding the latter, it speculates as to the possible relevance of the public rights doctrine. Finally, the conclusion suggests that
much of the legal uncertainty in this area results from the fact that while
American lawyers and judges believe that Article III courts are vitally important to the legitimacy of our constitutional order, no fully rounded
account exists as to what that importance is or the degree to which it is
beyond congressional control.
318 (1936) ("[T]he investment of the federal government with the powers of external
sovereignty did not depend on the affirmative grants of the Constitution."). Professor
Cleveland describes the emergence of judicial conceptions of an extratextual
"independent" national authority. See Cleveland, Origins, supra note 58. Of course, the
present Court might reach essentially the same foreign affairs power through McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415-17 (1819), by "summing up" the constitutionally
enumerated powers concerning foreign affairs, so that when added together they
constitute such a power.
60. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text for a reference to this debate.
61. Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters-Non-State Actors, Treaties,
and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BerkeleyJ. Int'l L. 137, 165 (2005).
Professor Bjorklund provides an extensive history of the American experience with the use
of extranational actors in treaty interpretation in the trade area. See generally Bjorklund,
supra note 6.
62. 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006).
63. The key mechanism for invoking the public rights doctrine in these cases is the
international and domestic doctrine of espousal, which transforms private domestic claims,
when they are transported to the international (or interstate) plane. This does not mean
that the Chapter 11 cases, which do not rely on espousal, fall outside of the public rights
doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 215-216.
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MARBURY AND THE DOMESTIC INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS

The presence of "international" ingredients in domestic American
64
adjudication was, we know, quite familiar to the Founding generation.
The treaty power and Article I's legislative grants over foreign affairs matters attest to the Framers' concern with America's place in the (then
European-dominated) world order. 65 So too does Article III, which extends the judicial power of the United States to a large category of disputes with an international flavor. 66 From the very beginning, American
courts enforced treaties 6 7 and customary international law.68 Indeed,
64. See The Federalist No. 80, at 476-77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
65. One of the driving forces in the adoption of the Constitution was the weakness of
the Articles of Confederation in this regard. For that reason treaties were included in the
Supremacy Clause. U.S. Const. art VI, cl. 2; see Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty 27-28
(1970) ("The states' defiance of America's treaty obligations.. . convinced even the most
ardent advocates of states' rights at the Convention that treaties should be the supreme law
of the land."); Walter Stahr, John Jay 145-222, 271-338 (2005) (detailing history of
American peace treaty with Britain and difficulties of ratification in Continental Congress);
The Federalist No. 64 (John Jay), supra note 64 (defending treaty power); cf. 2 The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 29, 389 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)
(describing offered supremacy clauses); 3 id. at 273, 286 (debating Supremacy Clause).
66. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L.J. 2347, 2352
(1999). A leading writer argues that alienage jurisdiction was "historically the single most
important grant of national court jurisdiction embodied in the [Judiciary Act of 1789]."
Wythe Holt, The Origins of AlienageJurisdiction, 14 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 547, 548 (1989).
67. E.g., Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813); see
Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law
in Constitutional Cases, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1919, 1971-76 (2003) [hereinafter Monaghan,
State Court Decisions] (discussing early decisions on impact of treaties on state law); see
also Lee, Original Jurisdiction, supra note 35 (describing originally intended role of the
Supreme Court in correcting treaty violations by American states).
68. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain enforcement rested upon specific statutory
authorization. 542 U.S. 692, 721, 725 (2004) (holding that Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2000), authorizes courts to entertain claims based on "narrow set of violations of
the law of nations," including three claims recognized in eighteenth century and "claims
based on present-day law of nations [that] rest on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of" the eighteenth-century claims). But even without a statutory predicate, "Our system
follows a practice of presumptive enforceability of customary international law, subject to
congressional override." Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary
International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L. Rev.
371, 384 (1997); see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in Foreign
Relations, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 111, 128-35 (discussing impact of Sosa). The status of
customary international law in American courts has become the subject of an intense
academic debate. The most recent entry, one sure to spark another round of debate, is
Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (2007) (interpreting Sosa
to reinforce the authors' claim that customary international law is not self-executing
federal common law). For a review of the literature with a special focus on Sosa, seeJulian
Ku &John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien
Tort Statute, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153, 156-76. For a comprehensive examination of
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much of the early Supreme Court's docket was taken up with such matters as international law, admiralty, prize litigation, and the like. 69 Moreover, as Sarah Cleveland has shown in an exhaustive examination, American understanding of foreign law has played a surprisingly large and
underappreciated role in understanding the American Constitution
70
itself.
The foregoing examples, of course, posed no threat to the Marburybased judicial duty "to say what the law is": All involve Supreme Court
determination of the content and the domestic significance of transnational norms. The Court was not "bound" by the holding of any foreign
tribunal, however eminent its authority.7 1 Thus, the Founding generation did not confront any supranational threat to maintaining "the essential attributes of the judicial power." And the Court's recent encounters
congressional authority under the Offences Clause, seeJ. Andrew Kent, Congress's UnderAppreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 Tex. L.
Rev. 843 (2007).
69. For a recent empirical survey of the Jay and Marshall Courts' "foreign affairs"
docket, see Note, Rethinking Early Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of
the Supreme Court's Docket, 114 Yale LJ. 855, 889 (2005) ("The docket of the Supreme
Court supports ... assertions that the early Court was heavily involved in foreign affairs.").
The lex mercatoria itself seems to have been viewed as a body of transcendent
international legal principles. "[T]he affairs of commerce are regulated by a law of their
own, called the law merchant or lex mercatoria,which all nations agree in and take notice
of." 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *273. Thus in Swift v. Tyson, an ordinary
commercial dispute,Justice Story could comfortably invoke the immense authority of Lord
Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, (1759) 2 Burr. 882, 887, 97 Eng. Rep. 614, 617 (KB.), in turn
quoting Cicero's classic declamation on natural law: "Non eit alia lex Rome, alia Athenis;
alia nunc, aliaposthac, sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una eademque lex obtenebit." 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842). See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Supreme Court, 2005
Term-Comment: Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (2005)
(arguing that citation of foreign law can rest on the law of nations).
70. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 Yale J. Int'l L. 1
(2006); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty
Decision, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 743 (2005) (discussing history of Court's use of foreign
law in constitutional cases).
71. To the founding generation international judicial tribunals were of course
nonexistent. Recognition of foreign judgments was governed by principles of comity.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§ 98 (1971) states that "a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a
contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States." Comity analysis is, of
course, applicable to civil judgments. Id. Foreign penal laws and judgments are not
usually accorded comity. See id. § 120. See generally Note, Actualizing the Trope of
Internationalism in Class Action Theory, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2814, 2826-29 (2005)
(discussing recognition of foreign judgments under Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act, 13 (pt. 2) U.L.A. 43 (2000), The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws, supra, and principles of international comity). For a recent and comprehensive
collection of materials on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and
arbitration awards, see Gary B. Born & Peter B. Rutledge, International Civil Litigation in
United States Courts 1009-82, 1126-40 (4th ed. 2007). The American Law Institute has
recently published a report. Am. Law Inst., Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute (2006).
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with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, and two International Court of
Justice judgments construing that article, 72 confirm the powerful hold of
Marbuy-based conceptions ofjudicial duty in the new supranational adjudicatory order. The Court categorically rejected giving preclusive domestic effect to the ICJjudgments, even though the United States was a party
73
to both proceedings.
The United States is a party to the "self-executing" Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,7 4 and (was) to an Optional Protocol providing that "[d] isputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
Convention" fell within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court ofJustice. 75 Article 36 obliges states detaining foreign nationals to
notify the foreign national's consular officials "upon request" and to inform detainees "without delay" that they have the right to make such a
request. The article goes on to provide that:
The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of the Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and
regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes
76
for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.
On three occasions, the Court has considered the domestic consequences of violations of the consular notification requirements. In Breard
v. Greene, the foreign-national defendant had failed to raise the Article 36
violation claim in the state court criminal proceeding. 77 In a hurriedly
reached decision, 78 the Court held that a state court procedural default
(forfeiture) rule could be given effect to bar Article 36 challenges arising
72. Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31);
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
73. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2683 (2006).
74. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR]; see Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2674-75 (discussing
U.S. ratification of VCCR). The concept of "non" self-executing treaties, i.e., treaties that
require legislation before they are enforceable in domestic (federal and state) courts, is
difficult to reconcile with the language of Article VI. But it is the norm, and the
conception itself extends back at least to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Foster v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
As Judge Kavanaugh recently reminds us, when a treaty is non-self-executing, it is the
implementing legislation and not the treaty that is the effective domestic law. See Fund for
Animals, Inc. v. Kempthome, 472 F.3d 872, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).
75. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. I, Apr.
24, 1961, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487. The United States has now withdrawn from the
Protocol. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2675.
76. VCCR, supra note 74, art. 36(2). Sanchez-Llamas contains the full text of Article
36. 126 S. Ct. at 2675 n.1.
77. 523 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1998).
78. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2704 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Breard is a per
curiam decision that the Court had to reach within the few hours available between the
time a petition for certiorariwas filed and a scheduled execution . . ").
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in a federal habeas proceeding. 79 In Medellin v. Dretke, the Court considered the domestic effect of an ICJjudgment obtained in a suit brought by
Mexico against the United States (in which the Medellin claim had been
espoused) .8 0 The ICJ had held that Article 36 created enforceable private rights and that American courts must not impose normal procedural
forfeiture rules to foreclose all consideration of such claims.8 1 While a
majority of the Court was able to wash its hands of the issues for the moment,8 2 elaborate separate opinions focused upon the significance of the
83
ICJ ruling.
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, now with Chief Justice Roberts writing and
Justice Alito participating, finally confronted what Medellin had postponed: the domestic legal significance of the ICJ rulings. 84 Assuming
79. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-76. The Court, as an alternative ground, rested upon
federal legislation governing habeas review of state criminal convictions that postdated the
Convention. Id. at 376-77.
80. 544 U.S. 660, 661-62 (2005); Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 12, 59-60, 62-65 (Mar. 31). Even prior to this decision, the litigation over the
Vienna Convention had elicited broad-ranging commentary frequently focused upon the
American federalism implications of the Convention. See Lee, Original Jurisdiction, supra
note 35, at 1881-82 & n.498.
81. Reviewing a habeas ruling by the Fifth Circuit, the Court agreed to decide two
questions: whether American courts are "bound" by the ICJ ruling, or in any event,
"whether a federal court should give effect [to the ICJ judgment] as a matter of judicial
comity and uniform treaty interpretation." Medellin, 544 U.S. at 661-62.
82. A per curiam opinion noted that at least five difficult antecedent issues relating to
the availability of federal habeas corpus to address these issues were presented. These
preliminary issues could be avoided, because, the Court noted, after Medellin had been
docketed, a petition for habeas, based on the ICJ's ruling, had been filed in the Texas
courts, and the President had announced that the United States would discharge its treaty
obligations by having the state courts give the requisite notice. Id. at 663-64. And the
Supreme Court could review the judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on
direct review. Id. at 666. Fourjustices would have granted a stay of the Court's proceeding
until the Texas courts had ruled. Id. at 672-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Texas
court upheld its prior ruling, in the process criticizing the presidential directive. Ex parte
Medellin, No. AP-75207, 2006 WL 3302639, at *16-*21 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2006),
petition for cert. filed Jan. 16, 2007).
83. These opinions seemed to treat the ICJ as having established the specific rights of
Medellin himself; the fact that private parties cannot institute proceedings before the ICJ
does not prevent Mexico from espousing such claims. See Lee, Original Jurisdiction, supra
note 35, at 1783, 1855-60, 1862-66 (articulating rule of espousal and examining
interaction of espousal and state sovereignty). In Part III of her four-person opinion,
Justice O'Connor concluded, with little detailed analysis, that the Court must give binding
effect to the ICJ judgment, and in any event should do so as a matter of comity. Medellin,
544 U.S. at 682-90 (O'Connor,J., dissenting). The preclusion point was treated briefly, id.
at 683-84, while her comity analysis seems to be an independent determination that the
ICJ correctly interpreted the treaty, id. at 684-90. (Surprisingly, Justice O'Connor voiced
little concern with maintaining the "essential attributes of the judicial power." See
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986); supra text
accompanying note 54.) Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justice Scalia, expressed
discomfort with the "must" analysis, but she seemed quite prepared to honor the ICJ
judgment as a matter of comity. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 667-72.
84. See 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2674 (2006).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:833

arguendo that the Convention did create enforceable private rights, 8 5 as
the ICJ had said, the Court held (quite convincingly, I should add) that
suppression of detainee statements (an issue not addressed by the ICJ)
was not required as a remedy either under the Convention or American
domestic law.8 6 More importantly for us, the Court reaffirmed Breard,
denying that the ICJ rulings precluded state courts from applying their
8 7
normal procedural default rules to Article 36 claims.
That the ICJ judgment conclusively fixed the meaning of Article 36
so far as the international obligations of the United States are concerned
seems to have been assumed, at least arguendo.8 8 But the established
principle is that "[t]he [national] courts ... have the final say as to the
meaning of an international agreement insofar as it is law of the United
States applicable to cases and controversies before the courts."89 Amici
international law experts argued, nonetheless, that "the United States is
obligated to comply with the Convention, as interpreted by the ICJ."90 This
preclusion argument surely has plausibility. The United States was a
party to a properly commenced ICJ proceeding. Domestic recognition
and enforcement of those rulings need not rest upon any conception of
comity;9 1 it could rest directly on the Convention or on the U.N. Char85. See id. at 2677-78. Justice Breyer, in dissent, sought to show that the Court's
assumption was well founded. Id. at 2693-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 2678-82 (majority opinion).
"Suppression would be a vastly
disproportionate remedy for an Article 36 violation," particularly since the right to
consular notification "is at best remotely connected to the gathering of evidence." Id. at
2681.
87. See id. at 2682-88. The Court was divided on the scope of the ICJ judgment on
this point. Compare id. at 2682 (stating that ICJ rulings do not preclude state court
application of normal procedural default rules), with id. at 2691 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(replying that state rules "sometimes" must yield).
88. See id. at 2683-85 (majority opinion); id. at 2688-89 (Ginsburg, J., concurring);
Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Reception by National Courts of Decisions of International
Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 45, 51 (1995) ("The sole consequence of the nonexecution of the decision would . . . be that the defaulting state incurs international
responsibility."); cf. David M. Reilly & Sarita Ord6fiez, Note, The Effect of the
Jurisprudence of the International Court ofJustice on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L.
& Pol. 435, 448 (1995) ("[T]he reception of ICJ decisions by domestic courts is sui
geris.
."). Judge Bedjaoui was the President of the International Court ofJustice from
1994 to 2001.
89. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 326 cmt.
b (1987). This description, I should add, seems to be predicated on a legal order that
predates the emerging supranational adjudicatory tribunals. Of course, this observation
does not show that the Restatement is incorrect. See Bedjaoui, supra note 88, at 51-52
(discussing effect of ICJ decisions on municipal courts' legal interpretations).
90. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2683 (2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Brief of International Court of Justice
Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11, Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669
(Nos. 04-10566 & 05-51)).
91. See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (discussing use of comity in
recognition of foreign judgments).
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ter.9 2 The power to make treaties, it would be said, surely subsumes the
power to create tribunals for their binding interpretation and application
93
even for domestic purposes.
Sanchez-Llamas clearly recoiled from this line of argument. The
Court's analysis drew sustenance from Marbuy-grounded conceptions of
the "essential nature of the judicial power":
[Petitioner's] second reason is less easily dismissed. He argues
that since Breard, the ICJ has interpreted the Vienna Convention
to preclude the application of procedural default rules to Article
36 claims ....
[S]everal amici contend that "the United States is obligated to
comply with the Convention, as interpreted by the ICJ." We
disagree....
Under our Constitution, "[t]he judicial Power of the
United States" is "vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." That 'judicial Power ... extend[s] to . . . Treaties."
And, as Chief Justice Marshall famously explained, that judicial
power includes the duty "to say what the law is." If treaties are to
be given effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law "is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department," headed by the
"one supreme Court" established by the Constitution. It is
against this background that the United States ratified, and the
Senate gave its advice and consent to, the various agreements
that govern referral of Vienna Convention disputes to the ICJ.
Nothing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that
its interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our
courts.

94

92. Hilton itself recognized that an analysis different from comity was required when
the foreign judgment was pursuant to a "compact." Id. at 166 (referencing views of
authorities at that time).
93. But direct American authority is hard to come by. See Reilly & Ord6fiez, supra
note 88, at 459-60. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan,
859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988), contains a comprehensive general, but ultimately not
helpful, discussion of the domestic impact of treaties. See also Reilly & Ord6fiez, supra
note 88, at 455-60 (discussing preclusion in U.S. courts by ICIjudgments).
94. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2683-84 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Brief of International Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 11, Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (Nos. 04-10566 & 05-51); U.S. Const. art.
III, § 1; id. § 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). The Court
continued:
The ICJ's decisions have "no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular case." Any interpretation of law the ICJ renders in the
course of resolving particular disputes is thus not binding precedent even as to the
ICJ itself' there is accordingly little reason to think that such interpretations were
intended to be controlling on our courts. The ICJ's principal purpose is to
arbitrate particular disputes between national governments. While each member
of the United Nations has agreed to comply with decisions of the ICJ "in any case
to which it is a party," the Charter's procedure for noncompliance-referral to
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Even Justice Breyer's pro-ICJ dissent, authored by a member of the Court
law,
well known for his sympathetic views toward the relevance of foreign
95
was reluctant to attribute preclusive effect to the ICJ judgment.
The Court's reasoning is intriguing. After invoking a freestanding
"essential attributes" argument drawn from Marbury, the Court nicely
converted it into a background interpretive principle, which it concluded
neither the Vienna Convention nor the U.N. Charter purported to contravene. This meant, for the Court, that the ICJ opinion was entitled to
no more than "respectful consideration," 96 which, at best, meant that the
ICJ rulings had in reality a status no greater than Skidmore deference, to
borrow a phrase from administrative law. 9 7 And here the ICJ was plainly
wrong in assessing the domestic implications of Article 36 violations. 98
Among other things, the ICJ had, the Court believed, completely failed to
appreciate the difference between inquisitorial and adversarial systems of
criminal justice with respect to the importance of procedural rules and
party initiative. 99 The Court refused to endorse an "extraordinary ...
exception to [American] procedural rules that is accorded to almost no
other right, including many of our most fundamental constitutional
protections." 100
Formally, Sanchez-Llamas did no more than interpret the legal documents that control the domestic effect of ICJ judgments, and it concluded that they were not intended to vary the standard rule that the
Supreme Court has the final say on the domestic significance of a foreign
treaty. Quite clearly, however, Marbury's description of the "essential
the Security Council by the aggrieved state-contemplates quintessentially
internationalremedies.
Id. at 2684-85 (citations omitted) (quoting Statute of the International Court of Justice
art. 59,June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993; U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1).
95. "I will assume," he wrote, "that the ICJ's interpretation does not bind this Court in
this case." Id. at 2700 (Breyer,J., dissenting). The ICJjudgment itself was only the third of
several reasons he advanced for concluding that state procedural default rules must, at
least "sometimes," give way to Article 36 claims. Id. at 2691 (emphasis omitted); see also id.
at 2698-700. But it was, in fairness, quite clearly the most important. Justice Breyer
extolled in rather lengthy fashion the role of the ICJ as an expositor of the principles of
international law and cited numerous instances in which "this Court has... looked to the
ICJ for guidance in interpreting treaties and in other matters of international law." Id. at
2700-02. Oddly, Justice Breyer made no attempt to apply his "sometimes" analysis to the
facts of the case, andJustice Ginsburg's concurrence said that the petitioner lost under the
Breyer standard. See id. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 2683, 2685 (majority opinion).
97. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). The agency's "more specialized
experience and broader investigations and information" may give its determinations
.power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. at 139-40. For a recent
comprehensive discussion of these issues in American administrative law, see Doug Geyser,
Note, Courts Still "Say What the Law Is": Explaining the Functions of the Judiciary and
Agencies After Brand X, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 2129 (2006).
98. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685-86.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2687-88.
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function" of the Court "to say what the law is" drove the opinion.1 0 ' The
Court was quite unwilling to surrender the keys of Saint Peter to say what
the federal law is in the American domestic context. "Why?" is the question. Presumably American legal rights and obligations can be conclusively determined for international purposes by "foreign" tribunals, and
on such a basis American officials can properly surrender American property, real and personal. Is the matter different when foreign tribunals'
determinations are presented to American tribunals and sought to be
given domestic effect? If so, is that because Article III requires that American (federal) courts have the final say on those obligations domestically?
Or that it requires such a result only when certain rights are involved, i.e.,
the "private rights" of American nationals? 0 2 To address these questions
we must broaden our inquiry to include the historical practice that extends back to the beginnings of the Constitution-mixed commission international arbitration' 0 3-as well as legal doctrine developed in an attempt to rationalize the legitimacy of the modern American
administrative state, particularly the "public rights doctrine.' u0 4 The next
two sections examine these topics.
III. HisTORicAL PRACTICE AND SUPRANATIONAL ADJUDICATION

Marbury'sjudicial law-declaring duty notwithstanding, state-state dispute arbitration has a pedigree at least as old as Marbuty itself. Since the
Jay Treaty of 1794, it has been clear that claims of American nationals
espoused by the United States against foreign sovereigns could be adjudicated by state-state mixed arbitration commissions.' 0 5 So far as practice
101. Professor Margaret McGuinness believes, however, that the decision is best
understood as part "of the persistent objection of the United States to any international
restrictions on the death penalty and the efforts of [various organizations] to nudge the
United States [in a different direction]." Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals,
and the Horizontal Integration of International Human Rights, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev.
755, 757 (2006).
102. It is, to say the least, strained to read the current AD/CVD statutes as having
altered the established practice and as having established a "right" in the American
competitor to whatever AD/CVD determinations were made by the federal administrative
remedies.
103. See infra Part III.
104. See infra Part W.
105. In a wide-ranging article, Professor Lee argues that the Founders had hoped that
the sorts of claims the Jay Treaty arbitral commission was designed to handle might be
settled in newly established national courts. Lee, Original Jurisdiction, supra note 35, at
1868-70. Specifically, he claims that the Supreme Court was intended to be a forum for
the domestic litigation of claims by foreign states against states for violation of treaties,
most notably the 1783 Treaty of Peace. Id. at 1884; see also id. at 1869 (discussing Jay
Treaty as reinforcing Supreme Court's role as state-foreign state arbitrator). But the
frequency and breadth of such violations, he notes, quickly rendered the possibility that
Great Britain would consent to litigation in the Supreme Court remote: "Epidemic
defection meant that the Supreme Court, as a national court, could no longer command
the mantle of a neutral tribunal vis-A-vis the foreign state since the treaty breach itself
seemed national in scope." Id. at 1868. Professor Lee argues that resolution of treaty-
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can settle meaning, 10 6 it establishes that the United States can enter international agreements creating state-state arbitration panels to resolve the
private law claims of its nationals against foreign governments. 1 0 7 This
practice has even included the reexamination of decisions of the Supreme Court itself.10 8
A. The Jay Treaty
The Jay Treaty is an important constitutive document of the Founding era. 10 9 The treaty fit nicely within the then-developing historical pattern, and its Articles VI and VII significantly prefigured NAFTA Chapters
11 and 19. As Professor Bjorklund writes:
International investment protections, including the doctrine of
denial of justice, developed within the ambit of the law of state
responsibility for injuries to aliens. The law of state responsibility has a long pedigree. It reached its apogee in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, although its underpinnings date back to Vattel and Grotius.1 10
The Jay Treaty itself was designed to discharge the unfulfilled
promises of the 1783 Treaty of Peace, which, inter alia, had sought to
protect the land and credit interests of British nationals in America. Article IV of the Peace Treaty had provided that "creditors on either side,
shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in
based controversies by an extranational body was accordingly not the preferred solution
the Founders had envisioned in the Original Jurisdiction Clause, but nonetheless an
alternative that they had contemplated in the constitutional framework. See id. at 1869.
106. See id. at 1855-60 (describing espousal practice). In Fair Lumber Imports, the
United States placed its principal reference on this settled government practice. See Brief
for Respondents at 18-30, Coal. for Fair Lumber Imports, Exec. Comm. v. United States,
471 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 05-1366) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents, Fair
Lumber Imports]. But see Reply Brief, FairLumber Imports, supra note 42, at 2-8 (addressing
government arguments). The extent to which settled practice should fix constitutional
meaning is, of course, a (very large) topic in and of itself. But one to which I strongly
gravitate.
107. The petitioner's attempt in Fair Lumber Imports to characterize the American
importers' claims in Chapter 19, a state-state arbitration, as "really" one against the
Canadian exporters rather than the Canadian government has economic plausibility, of
course. But it is a long road from that proposition to establishing the existence of a
property right in the federal administrative determination. See infra note 201 and
accompanying text.
108. See infra Part III.C.
109. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat.
116 [hereinafter Jay Treaty]. The classic work on the treaty is Samuel Flagg Bemis, Jay's
Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy (Yale Univ. Press 1962) (1923). My
colleague Jack Coffee suggests that this Article should be entitled Current Probtems Under the
Jay Treaty.
110. Bjorklund, supra note 6, at 818. Espousal was an alternative to war. See supra
note 36. Debtor states now vigorously challenge the belief that armed intervention is a
legitimate means of enforcing debt collection. See the extended discussion by Judge
Cabranes in EM Ltd. v. Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 466 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007).
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sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.""1 ' Thus,
states should not impede the domestic law claims of A (a British creditor
or landowner) against B (a state debtor or land claimant). In many
112
states, particularly Virginia, this demand on the state went unhonored,
much to the dismay ofJohn Jay when he was Secretary for Foreign Affairs
under the Articles of Confederation. 13 State violations of Article IV were
among the factors causing considerable strain between the two
114
nations.
Accordingly, Article VI of the Jay Treaty created a mixed commission
to arbitrate claims by British subjects concerning
debts, to a considerable amount, which were bona fide contracted before the peace.., and that by the operation of various
lawful impediments since the peace, not only the full recovery of
the said debts has been delayed, but also the value and security
thereof have been, in several instances, impaired and lessened,
so that by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the British creditors cannot
15

now obtain

. .

.

full

and adequate

compensation.1
Article VI went on to require that the United States "make full and complete compensation" for the losses "occasioned by the lawful impediments."11 6 The Commission was directed "to determine the [losses] re111. Definitive Treaty of Peace art. IV, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 82. One
year later, Pinckney's Treaty resolved war-related claims of United States citizens against
Spain by the creation of a similar mixed arbitration commission. See Treaty of Friendship,
Limits and Navigation art. XXI, U.S.-Spain, Oct. 27, 1795, 8 Stat. 138, 150 [hereinafter
Pinckney's Treaty]; see also A Convention, U.S.-Spain, Aug. 11, 1802, 8 Stat. 198, 198
[hereinafter Spanish Arbitration Treaty]. Some aspects of the relevant land claim history
litigation involved in the Peace Treaty and the Jay Treaty are discussed in Monaghan, State
Court Decisions, supra note 67, at 1971-76.
112. Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 Duke L.J. 1421, 1438-49 [hereinafter Holt, Judiciary
Act], provides an exhaustive account of the American hostility toward their British
creditors before, during, and after the Revolutionary War, principally in the South.
Virginia, the largest debtor, was particularly recalcitrant. Combs, supra note 65, at 83.
Holt assigns state violations of the Jay Treaty as one of the reasons for the Constitutional
Convention of 1787. See Holt, Judiciary Act, supra, at 1451-52.
113. Jay-a principal negotiator of the Treaty of Paris, Secretary to the Continental
Congress, Chief Justice of the United States, and negotiator of the Jay Treaty-untiringly
sought to secure state compliance. Stahr, supra note 65, at 145-222, 271-338. Jay
authored only a few of The Federalist essays, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 64. No. 64 is a defense of
the constitutional provisions concerning the making of treaties. The Federalist No. 64
(John Jay), supra note 64.
114. Combs, supra note 65, at 27-28; see also Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The
Age of Federalism 375-449 (1993) (discussing events surrounding treaty's negotiation and
ratification).
115. Jay Treaty, supra note 109, art. V1.
116. Id. The article stated:
It is agreed that.., the United States will make full and complete compensation
for the same to the said Creditors: But it is distinctly understood, that this
provision is to extend to such losses only as have been occasioned by the lawful
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spectively according to the merits of the several cases, due regard being
had to all the circumstances thereof, and as equity and justice shall ap1 7
pear to them to require."
Article VI has gone largely unnoticed. Observe, however, that: (a) It
contemplates the resolution of private foreign claims against American
nationals arising out of state (or colonial) law in state-state arbitration
panels; and (b) the specific rights of American nationals are not adversely
affected. Even so, Professor David Currie notes:
During the House debate Representative Page attacked this provision as vesting judicial power outside the federal courts in violation of Article III. Representative Bourne's response that the
matter fell outside that Article because "the Judicial authority is
incompetent to take cognizance of controversies between independent nations" was clever but incomplete. For although the
United States was substituted for the original debtor as defendant, individual British subjects were still to prosecute their own
claims; the modern view is that private suits against the Government, when authorized, are "Controversies to which the United
States shall be a party" within the meaning of Article III, § 2. On
the other hand, Congress is still recognized as having the option
to create alternative tribunals for such claims on the ground
that it did not have to consent to be sued at all. A better answer
to the Article III objection might be that an international tribudoes not exercise the judicial power of the
nal, like a state court,
8
United States."1
We postpone Professor Currie's own analysis. Suffice it to say that, if
acceptable, Article VI does show at a very early stage in American history
that governmental "outsourcing" of determinations of American law (the
underlying claims of the British creditors originate in American domestic
law and are then protected from state interference by the treaty) was not
thought to go to the heart of the matter. 1 19 BNPs adjudicated foreign
impediments aforesaid, and is not to extend to losses occasioned by ... other
causes ....

Id. Pinckney's Treaty, concluded in 1795, provided for a similar mixed commission to
resolve war-related claims against United States citizens. Pinckney's Treaty, supra note 111,
art. XXI; see also Spanish Arbitration Treaty, supra note 111, at 200. Section VI of the Jay
Treaty was repealed in 1802 by a subsequent treaty between the United States and Great

Britain, providing for the payment of six hundred thousand pounds sterling to the Crown
"for the use of the persons described in the said sixth article." Convention, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,

art. 1,Jan. 8, 1802, 8 Stat. 196.
117. Jay Treaty, supra note 109, art VI.
118. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress 212 n.46 (1997)
omitted).

(citations

"In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, the United States Senate

repeatedly rejected proposals to join with 'foreign powers (England, specifically)' to
[suppress the slave trade]," in part because of a fear that the rights of American citizens
would be determined by mixed commissions. Resnik, supra note 51, at 1586.
119. To be sure, the relevant domestic law is state, not federal, and perhaps a
distinction could be fashioned along these lines. We should note here that private
commercial arbitration agreements often provide for determinations of federal law by
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claims based upon American substantive law; but the BNP's award had
limited domestic effect, since the individual rights of American nationals
were not adversely affected. Nonetheless, the decision had some domestic effect. No one, for example, doubted that it was lawful for the United
States government to transfer funds to satisfy the BNP awards.
Article VII of the Jay Treaty takes us an important step farther. It
concerns largely (but not wholly) the rights of American nationals: "divers merchants and others, citizens of the United States" who complained
of "irregular or illegal captures or condemnations of their vessels and
other property, under colour of authority or commissions from his Majesty."120 Like the BNP established under Article VI, the Article VII mixed
commission was authorized to "decide the claims in question according
to the merits of the several cases, and to justice, equity, and [unsurpris12 1
ingly, given the overriding relevance of prize law] the laws of nations."
Here again administration of preexisting legal principles is transferred
from domestic courts to a supranational tribunal. Domestic law was a
significant ingredient of each claim.12 2 Awards in over 500 cases were
nonnational arbitrators. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 636-37 (1985). If outsourcing is the problem, it is not clear why "consent" of the
arbitrating parties solves the problem. The argument might be that the award has no stare
decisis effect. The award would have real life consequences, however. See infra note 284.
120. Jay Treaty, supra note 109, art VII.
121. Id.
122. In FairLumber Imports, the petitioner sought to distinguish these proceedings on
the ground that Article VII "changed" the otherwise controlling law. Reply Brief, Fair
Lumber Imports, supra note 42, at 3-4. Why that should matter was not made clear, and in
any event the claim seems factually inaccurate. Jay Treaty claimants had to prove the
validity of their claims under domestic law. See 2 American State Papers, Foreign Relations
384-85 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton
1832) (1789-1815) (describing requirement that it be proven that bona fide debt had
been contracted before peace and prior to any lawful impediment imposed by states). The
major distinction between having the claims adjudicated in U.S. federal court and in the
binational tribunal seems to have been in the form of evidence that would be accepted to
prove indebtedness. See Bemis, supra note 109, at 383-84, 436-37 (discussing
admissibility of more evidence in tribunal proceedings as compared to American courts).
The Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of Mexico
for the Adjustment of Claims was designed in large measure to resolve American claims
against the Mexican government arising out of the political turmoil in Mexico in the
middle decades of the nineteenth century. Convention Between the United States of
America and the Republic of Mexico for the Adjustment of Claims, U.S.-Mex., pmbl., July
4, 1868, 15 Stat. 679 [hereinafter Convention with Mexico]. The Convention provided for
espousal-based claims resolution by two commissioners who, in turn, chose an umpire to
resolve claims when they could not agree. Id. art I. The umpire chosen was the eminent
Dr. Francis Lieber, who "in at least some cases ... did not profess to be guided by any
definite rules" and (in Dr. Lieber's words) instead stood ready to invoke the "power and
duty which is possessed by the judges of peace in several countries of the European
continent .... It is the office of peacemaking by mutual cessions." 2 John Bassett Moore,
History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a
Party 1301 n.2 (Washington, G.P.O. 1898) [hereinafter Moore, History and Digest]. In at
least one case the commissioners rejected a decision so grounded. Id. at 1302 n.2.
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made in favor of American litigants. 123
Glass v. Sloop Betsey gave indirect support to Article VII's framework
in a contemporaneous foray into another sensitive issue in Anglo-American relations. 124 The federal district courts had been dealing with suits
involving French warships and privateers preying on British and allied
shipping in the Atlantic Ocean. 12 5 Given the hazards of sailing prizes to
the French West Indies or France, the seized vessels (and their valuable
cargoes) were often brought into proximate American ports like Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Charleston, there to be condemned as prize by
French consular courts and their cargo sold to eager American
merchants. 126 Some of the aggrieved owners of the seized cargo, including (importantly) American nationals, sued in U.S. federal district courts
seeking "restitution" for the value of their cargoes. 127 Difficult issues
arose. Did the district courts have any statutory jurisdiction over prize, as
opposed to civil admiralty and maritime, matters? 128 More importantly,
could they order restitution in face of the settled law-of-nations rule,
which the Court confirmed a year later in Talbot v. Janson,129 that the
legality of the capture of the vessel as prize was not a question for adjudi13 0
cation by the courts of a neutral country?
The Supreme Court held that the district courts had jurisdiction to
order restitution.1 31 More importantly here, though counsel had declined the Court's invitation to argue the issue,13 2 a unanimous Court in
a single paragraph in a one-page opinion by Chief Justice Jay, "decreed
and adjudged" that the French consular courts could not exercise jurisdiction because "no foreign power can of right institute, or erect, any
court of judicature of any kind, within the jurisdiction of the United
States."1 33 The Court articulated an important exception: "but such only
as may be warranted by, and be in pursuance of treaties." 13 4 And the
13 5
Court stated that the French consular courts were not "so warranted."
Article VII of the Jay Treaty seems to be the sort of warrant that would
123. The commission appointed pursuant to Article VII of the Jay Treaty issued a total
of 565 awards, 553 of which were to American claimants. See 1 Moore, History and Digest,
supra note 122, at 342-43.
124. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794).
125. See William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic 82-84 (1995)
(describing historical context of Glass case).
126. Id.
127. See Glass, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 16; see also Casto, supra note 125, at 82 (describing
suits filed by British owners).
128. See Glass, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 16.
129. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 155, 157 (1795) (Paterson, J.); id. at 159 (Iredell, J.); id. at
168 (Cushing, J.).
130. Glass, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 16.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 15-16.
133. Id. at 16.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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have easily met the Court's approval. But it is extraordinary that the
Court suggested that if authorized by treaty, an extraterritorial foreign
court on U.S. soil-an animal entirely different from a bilateral mixed
commission-might be constitutionally competent to displace U.S. courts
in the adjudication of presumptively state-law restitution claims brought
136
by an American national against a foreigner.
B. Subsequent Practice
Article VII alone arguably did not quite cover "private law claims of
American nationals" because the applicable substantive law (prize law)
was part of public international law, which seems to have been understood in the Founding period as a distinctively "independent" body of
law. But the pattern of compromising American claims in arbitration
proceedings against foreign sovereigns took strong hold, whatever the
underlying sources of the applicable substantive law. 13 7 By 1965, the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations of the United States would state
quite categorically that the United States "may waive or settle a claim
against a foreign state . . . [even] without the consent of [the injured]
national." 138 Seven years later, Professor Louis Henkin would write that
settling claims of nationals against foreign governments was an "established international practice reflecting traditional international theory. " 39 And he said the "United States has sometimes disposed of the
claims of its citizens without their consent, or even without consultation
136. Id.; cf. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) ("[Ajdmiralty
jurisdiction can be exercised in the states .. . only [in courts] which are established in
pursuance of the 3d Article of the Constitution.").
137. See Brief for Respondents, Fair Lumber Imports, supra note 106, at 20-22
(discussing examples of American resort to supranational arbitration from 1839 to modern
era); see also 1 Richard B. Lillich & Burns H. Weston, International Claims: Their
Settlement by Lump Sum Agreements 26-27 (1974) (finding, from 1794 to end of World
War II, at least 249 uses of arbitration to settle disputes, with United States participating in
some arbitrations); John Bassett Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20 Pol. Sci. Q.
385, 398-417 (1905) (discussing examples of compromising American claims in
supranational arbitration). Professor Bjorklund states:
The modem era of mixed claims commissions is usually traced to the Jay Treaty
of 1794, which established panels to resolve disputes between the United States
and Great Britain. By that treaty, the two countries agreed to settle claims
stemming from the Revolutionary War. From 1794 until the onset of the Second
World War, adjudicatory settlement, usually by means of mixed claims
commission arbitration, was used in at least 249 cases. Most of the claims settled
were personal injury and property claims arising from "civil rebellion,
international conflict, and miscellaneous maritime seizures."
Bjorklund, supra note 6, at 826-27 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lillich & Weston, supra,
at 27).
138. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 213
(1965).
139. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 262 (1972).
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with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as distin140
guished from those of the nation as a whole."
Dames & Moore v. Regan states the current American law. 141 There,
the Court sustained executive orders designed to implement an executive
agreement between Iran and the United States securing the release of
American hostages held in Iran. 142 That agreement called for termination of "all litigation as between the Government of each party and the
nationals of the other" and for settlement of pending claims through
143
binding arbitration before a tribunal established under the agreement.
An implementing executive order "suspended" all claims pending in
144
American courts that fell within the jurisdiction of the claims tribunal.
The principal issue was the validity of that order. There was, however, no
suggestion that the order violated Article III or the Due Process Clause by
substituting a different adjudicatory tribunal. The Court assumed that
any such issues were foreclosed by settled practice, citing both the Re45
statement and Professor Henkin.
A troublesome wrinkle in the Court's opinion remains to be considered. In determining whether Congress had restricted presidential authority to establish an arbitration commission by enacting the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 146 the Court rejected an argument that
the presidential claims suspension had "circumscribed the jurisdiction of
the United States courts in violation of Art. III."147 The Court first weakly
responded that the only effect of the executive order was to "suspend"
the claims, not to divest the federal courts ofjurisdiction-a surely unconvincing response since the Court acknowledged that the only claims
that would not be conclusively resolved were those that were outside of
the jurisdiction of the arbitration commission. 148 The Court then went
on to say:
140. Id. at 262-63.
141. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
142. Id. at 688.
143. Id. at 665 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, reprinted
in I Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports 3 (1983)). In FairLumber Imports the government
correctly observes that the mixed commission's jurisdiction over debts and contracts
necessarily assumed resort to municipal law, not a wholly new body of law. Brief for
Respondents, FairLumber Imports, supra note 106, at 28-29.
144. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 665-66. The implementing executive orders also
nullified all prejudgment attachments against Iran's assets in actions against Iran in
American courts and ordered transfer to Iran of all of its assets in U.S. banks, except for
one billion dollars to cover awards against Iran by the claims tribunal. Id. at 664-65.
145. Id. at 678-80. Subsequently, the Court reiterated the same point regarding
historical practice in Garamendi. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003).
146. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2000)).
147. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 684.
148. Id. at 684-85.
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This case, in short, illustrates the difference between modifying
federal-courtjurisdiction and directing the courts to apply a different rule of law. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch
103 (1801). The President has exercised the power, acquiesced in by
Congress, to settle claims and, as such, has simply effected a change in
the substantive law governing the lawsuit. Indeed, the very example
of sovereign immunity belies petitioner's argument. No one
would suggest that a determination of sovereign immunity divests the federal courts of 'Jurisdiction." Yet, petitioner's argument, if accepted, would have required courts prior to the enactment of the FSIA to reject as an encroachment on their
determination of a foreign state's
jurisdiction the President's
149
sovereign immunity.

The general reference to Schooner Peggy is unilluminating; that decision does no more than make the general distinction between the altera150
tion of substantive rules and the alteration of jurisdictional ones.
When the Court said that the President "has simply effected a change in
the substantive law governing the lawsuit," the import of this sentence
must be understood to say only that, in so doing, the President had not
attempted to affect the jurisdiction of the Article III courts. 5 1 All that
occurred was the elimination of a defense (sovereign immunity), which at
least benefited the American private law claimants, 152 although it eliminated their forum of choice.' 53 And whatever the limits on the Presi149. Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
150. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109-10 (1801)
(discussing Court's obligation to enforce alteration of substantive rules but not
jurisdictional rules).
151. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 685; cf. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396,
420 (2003) (holding that executive order preempted California statute on Holocaust
insurance claims). There is, of course, considerable dispute over the existence and scope
of presidential "legislative" authority in foreign affairs. The most recent entrants are
Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54
UCLA L. Rev. 309, 311-13 (2006), and Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive
Agreements, 93 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007). See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The
President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Essay in Constitutional Interpretation
(2002) (arguing that Constitution vests President with authority over foreign affairs and
vests Congress with power to limit President's power).
152. The Court did not independently pursue the question whether FSIA had itself
eliminated the defense.
153. The practice of executive foreign policy determinations closing the doors of the
federal courts seems to be gaining traction. See, for example, Judge Kavanaugh's
dissenting opinion in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). A sequel to Dames & Moore rejected an argument that the
claims settlement process constituted a taking of property requiring just compensation.
Abrahim-Youri v. United States, 139 F.3d 1462, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Moreover, foreign
arbitration panels are widely assumed to be capable of fairly applying the relevant
American substantive law. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1985). Although this may be more fiction than reality, the point is
that prior arbitrations have been at least formally charged with respecting the law creating
the underlying obligations, and, frequently, this has included references to federal
statutory law.
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dent's authority to fashion judicial door-closing or substantive rules on
his own, one cannot extrapolate from that the broader idea that the President (or for that matter Congress), in transferring cases to arbitration,
has an unlimited power to alter the otherwise applicable substantive law.
C. Reexamination of Supreme Court Decisions
None of the foregoing discussion involved direct review of a state
court decision by a tribunal other than the Supreme Court.' 5 4 The
Founding generation, I believe, simply would not have contemplated that
Congress could authorize any such review by foreign tribunals. 1 55 This
would apply a fortiori to international review of decisions of the Supreme
Court itself.
Seen in that light, the work of the mixed commission established by
the Treaty of Washington has not received the attention from American
constitutional lawyers that it deserves. 15 6 The leading legal historian of
the period, Charles Fairman, scarcely gives it any notice in his two
volumes. 15 7 But the commission's proceedings have considerable current
relevance. Article XII of the treaty gave the commission jurisdiction over
a wide (but by no means all-encompassing) range of claims involving
American and British nationals against the two governments arising out
of the Civil War. The overwhelming bulk of the claims, however, were
154. While Martin v. Hunter'sLessee sustained congressional authority to authorize the
latter review, even this landmark decision did not still future challenges to the Court's
appellate jurisdiction. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 351 (1816). "Between 1789 and 1860 the
courts of Virginia, Ohio, Georgia, Kentucky, South Carolina, California, and Wisconsin
denied that the Supreme Court had the power to review state court judgments on writs of
error." Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 479 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter Hart & Wechsler]. State legislative efforts
mirrored the controversy over the Court's jurisdiction. Id. The Court recognized that
Congress could, in fact, authorize (at least initially) such review in the inferior federal
courts. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 338; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) (discussing
habeas corpus); Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing
congressional grants of authority to review state-courtjudgments); Hart & Wechsler, supra,
at 481. Hamilton made the same point in The Federalist No. 82. The Federalist No. 82
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 64, at 494-95.
155. This formulation, of course, logically could mean that they had no specific
thoughts pro or con. But the history behind the Constitution's effort to draw the states
into a union closer than that under the Articles of Confederation is not consonant with
review of state courts by "distant" foreign tribunals.
156. Treaty Claims, Fisheries, Navigation of the St. Lawrence, American Lumber on
the River St. John, Boundary, U.S.-Gr. Brit., May 8, 1871, 17 Stat. 863 [hereinafter Treaty of
Washington].
157. 6 Charles Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-88 (1971); 7 id. (1987). Fairman briefly describes the
treaty in a section discussing Morrison Waite, a future Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, and his participation in the claims against Great Britain-generally known
as the "Alabama Claims," which were not within Article XII. See id. at 78-79 (discussing
Treaty of Washington, supra note 156); see also id. at 752 n.25 (discussing Alabama Claims
treatment in Treaty of Washington, supra note 156).
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brought against the United States on behalf of British claimants.' 5 8 Only
nineteen American claims against Great Britain were submitted, and all
were dismissed. 159 By contrast, about 480 British claims came before the
commission. 160 The commission proceeded in customary form. Both
countries appointed representatives, and they agreed upon a neutral
commissioner. 16' The claims presented were by way of espousal; agents
162
of the respective governments made the presentations.
What is striking is that the commission clearly purported to "review"
prize decisions of the United States Supreme Court (and the House of
Lords) .163 Indeed, the extent of the jurisdiction claimed is quite astonishing. In the Sir William Peel, the lead discussion of one of several cases
"argued and submitted together," 64 Mr. Robert Hale, the American representative, is reported to have stated that:
He admitted fully the jurisdiction of the commission, and their power
and duty under the treaty to review the final judgments of the prize
courts of ultimate resort of the respective nations as not conclusive upon the respective governments which might intervene on
behalf of their subjects against the judgments of those courts,
such jurisdiction having been long since fully established by the
direct decision of the commission ....
That while, therefore, the right of the commission to sit in judgment
upon the validity and correctness of (he judgments of the prize courts of
the United States upon these cases is not now questioned, such validity
and correctness are to be determined only in accordance with
the settled principles of prize law, as recognized by the two
countries.
That in reviewing the judgments of the highest appellate
courts of either of the two countries, high contracting parties to
the treaty, the high reputation of those courts respectively, the
weight uniformly given to the decisions of each by the other and
the rules of international comity and mutual respect dictate that
such judgments are not to be rashly or hastily overruled or reversed; but only on a clear showing of
a violation of the rules of
165
international law in re minime dubia.
Mr. Hale apparently framed the general issue in denial of justice terms:
158. 1 Moore, History and Digest, supra note 122, at 692-93.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 692.
161. Id. at 689-90.
162. Id. at 683-93 (describing formation and operation of commission).
163. See id. (discussing treaty's treatment of prize disputes); see also 4 id. at 3838-43
(discussing Commission's review of The Peterhoff, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 28 (1867)); id. at
3902-11 (The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862)); id. at 3911-23 (The Circassian,
69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 135 (1865)); id. at 3928-35 (The Springbok, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 1 (1867));
id. at 3935-48 (The Sir William Peel, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 517 (1867)); id. at 3950 (The
Volant, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 179 (1867)); id. at 3950-57 (The Science, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 178
(1867)); id. at 3957-58 (The Georgia, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 32 (1869)).
164. 4 id. at 3935.
165. Id. at 3942-43 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:833

That the question to be decided in these cases is whether injustice has been done to the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty by
the judicial tribunals of the United States; and that the commission certainly can not find that such injustice has been done,
unless they find that the well-settled principles
of international
166
law have been violated by those tribunals.
The United States commissioner did not challenge this description; indeed, he thought it was not an issue. 16 7 And the determinations of the
commission were to be considered "as a full, perfect, and final settlement
of all such claims as are mentioned in Article XII. of this treaty upon
168
either government."
In the Sir William Peel, the report sets out the American proceedings
fully. The prize court decision ordered restitution of the vessel, but because of its doubt, decreed that costs be paid by claimants and no damages awarded.1 69 The Supreme Court's opinion was carefully described,
including its reversal of the order on costs. 170 The commission, over the
dissent of the American representative, awarded the claimants $272,920,
apparently premised on its disagreement with the Supreme Court's inter17 1
pretation of the applicable substantive law.
The Sir William Peel reflected the general practice of close examination of the Supreme Court's decisions. In the Dashing Wave, for example,
the recital reported the Supreme Court decision "to which report reference is made for the ... peculiar facts of the case. No proofs were made
172
before the commission substantially changing the facts as there stated."
The commission reviewed the decision, and viewing its decision as controlled by the principles it had announced in the Sir William Peel, unani73
mously disallowed all the claims.1
D. The Appointments Clause
Consideration of an apparently sidebar issue, namely, the Appointments Clause, 174 proves to be quite illuminating. Appointment to these
temporary, ad hoc mixed commissions has not generally been thought to
implicate that clause. Nonetheless, in FairLumber Imports, the petitioner
urged that BNPs violated the clause because both American and non166. Id. at 3943 (internal quotation marks omitted). The standard of review applied
by the commission seems to have been more akin to independent judgment than a more
deferential standard of review. It is difficult to say without a comprehensive discussion of
the proceedings.
167. Id. at 3952-53.
168. 1 id. at 690 (discussing Treaty of Washington, supra note 156, arts. XI & XII).
169. 4 id. at 3947.
170. Id. at 3935-36.
171. Id. at 3948.
172. Id. at 3949.
173. Id.
174. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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American members were not appointed consistently with the clause. 1 75
The government responded as expected, namely, that judicial precedent
confirmed historical practice: BNP members are not "officers" of the
17 6
United States within the meaning of the Appointments Clause.
Alexander Hamilton, it noted, had defended the Jay Treaty against precisely such a charge. 177 The government said: "We are aware of no legal
precedent or history of practice that requires members of case-specific
international arbitral panels established under an international agreement entered into by the United States to be appointed under the
Appointments Clause, and the Coalition has pointed to none. '1 78 The
government then went on to cite prior opinions of the Attorney General
179
and Supreme Court decisions.
In FairLumber Imports petitioners had insisted that the BNP's domestic law efficacy required compliance with all constitutional requirements,
presumably including the Appointments Clause. 18 0 This argument resonated with the Office of Legal Counsel's (OLC) testimony at the United
States-Canadian Free Trade Agreement hearings. 18 ' Ever zealous of presidential prerogative, OLC argued that without presidential sanction the
BNP decisions could have no domestic effect.18 2 "[P]anels and committees are international bodies," OLC said.18 3 "While the United States
would be absolutely bound to adhere to panel decisions as a matter of
international law, neither the President nor government agencies may
constitutionally be required to implement panel and committee decisions
as a matter of domestic United States law."' 8 4 The testimony was advanced in support of a statutory provision that would have authorized
175. Brief of Petitioner Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports Executive Committee at
48-52, Coal. for Fair Lumber Imports, Exec. Comm. v. United States, 471 F.3d 1329 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (No. 05-1366).
176. Brief for Respondents, Fair Lumber Imports, supra note 106, at 45-53.
177. Id. at 46-47 (citing Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. 37 (Jan. 6, 1796),
reprinted in 20 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 13, 14, 20 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974)).
178. Id. at 46.
179. Id. at 48-52. United States v. Hartwell explained that the term "officer" connoted
tenure, duration, emolument, and duties," attributes that were "continuing and
permanent, not occasional or temporary." 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1868).
180. Reply Brief, FairLumber Imports, supra note 42, at 27-28.
181. The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 81-82 (1988) (testimony of John 0. McGinnis, Deputy Assistant
Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel) [hereinafter McGinnis Testimony]. The United
States-Canadian Free Trade Agreement was a precursor to NAFTA. United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter
U.S.-Can. F.T.A.].
182. McGinnis Testimony, supra note 181, at 81. OLC, like the petitioner in Fair
Lumber Imports, relied upon Buckley v. Valeo, 426 U.S. 1, 126, 140-41 (1976). See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 81, Coal. for Fair Lumber Imports, Exec. Comm. v. United
States, 471 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 05-1366) [hereinafter Transcript, Fair Lumber
Imports].
183. McGinnis Testimony, supra note 181, at 82.
184. Id. at 81 (emphasis omitted).
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(but not mandated) the President to order federal compliance with BNP
decisions.
The OLC testimony drew no distinction between NAFTA- and treatybased BNPs. While no reasoning and supporting authority were cited to
buttress the OLC testimony, entailing complexities well beyond the scope
of this Article, the lineage of the specific argument is familiar enough.
The U.S. Code is full of "assimilative" provisions, as Professor Swaine reminds us.' 8 5 "Assimilative statues do not, in and of themselves, assign
legislative authority to any international actor. Instead, they direct the
President or other executive branch officials to abide by, or otherwise
take into account, lawmaking by international institutions."'u 6 The
NAFTA Implementation Act would seem to constitute sufficient assimila87
tive legislation.1
OLC's argument prefigured the now-fashionable claim that international law and obligations have no independent domestic force without
political ratification. 1 88 If the Appointments Clause is thought to provide
a constitutional base for this result, the effect will be sweeping. Generally
stated, the argument seems to assert that any new legal international obligation is domestically ineffective unless all of the promulgators have satisfied the Appointments Clause (i.e., never), or the President is given discretion to adopt the decision.'8 9
Suffice it to note here that the implications of the OLC arguments
are far from clear, at least so far as Article III is concerned. BNPs' decisions usually require no domestic judicial involvement, but they clearly
have had some effect domestically. The governments involved discharge
their obligations by the payment of money or the recognition of title or
property. The basis for any such conduct by American officials is puz-

185. Swaine, supra note 52, at 1519-22.
186. Id. at 1519.
187. See id. at 1521-22 & n.108 (describing legislation assimilating prior delegations
of power to supranational actors and citing NAFTA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(g) (7) (A) (2000), as an example of such delegation).
188. Vincent G. Levy, Note, Enforcing International Norms in the United States After
Roper v. Simmons: The Case of Juvenile Offenders Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 45
Colum.J. Transnat'l L. 262, 292-304 (2006), provides an excellent review of the literature.
See also supra note 68 on the status of customary international law. For a recent iteration
of that position in the context of ICJ judgments, see Julian G. Ku, International
Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (2006). Denying the
"new world court order," Professor Ku argues that "retaining political branch control over
compliance with international tribunal judgments is best understood as a mechanism for
avoiding an impermissible delegation of the U.S. foreign affairs power to international
tribunals." Id.; cf. Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward
Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 628 (2007)
(cataloguing and evaluating uses of foreign and international law by jurists).
189. Presidential discretion could come from an authorizing statute or through the
legislation subject to presentment claims.
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zling under the OLC's argument.1 9 0 Indeed, OLC itself seems aware of
that fact. In a letter to the House Judiciary Committee transmitting its
Senate testimony on NAIFTA, OLC said:
We are aware that your Committee, after consulting with
the Department of Justice, has considered a formulation different than the one we recommend, which would provide that the
President may "advise" government agencies of the international obligations of the United States, flowing from the decisions rendered by binational panels and committees .... Government agencies that had merely been "advised" of panel and
committee decisions would be under no legal obligation to implement those decisions. Indeed, they probably would lack the legal
authority to do so.19 1
And while BNP awards do not create vested rights in the American claimants so long as the funds or property are in the possession of the government,19 2 the assumption seems to have been that the awards themselves
would have domestic claim-preclusive effect. 193 In Ford v. United States,
arising out of the Treaty of Washington, the mixed commission had
awarded a British claimant a sum of money that American heirs believed
190. So too is OLC's conclusion that the conduct of American officials can bind the
United States on the international level, even though the Appointments Clause has not
been satisfied. Moreover, the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2000)
(incorporating state-law crimes occurring in federal enclaves into federal law), seems to be
invalid if OLC's argument is correct. Federal law could not incorporate future state-law
crimes because the state legislators enacting those offences had not been appointed
consistent with the Appointments Clause. However, this is not the case. The
constitutionality of the forward-looking aspects of the Assimilative Crimes Act was sustained
in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 297 (1958).
191. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the judiciary,
105th Cong. 504, 505 (1988) (letter of Thomas M. Boyd, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen.)
(emphasis added).
192. La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 460-62 (1899).
193. The compacts creating the arbitration commissions contain sweeping finality
provisions. For example, Article VI of the Jay Treaty provided that commission awards
"shall in all cases be final and conclusive, both as to the justice of the claim, and to the
amount of the sum to be paid to the creditor or claimant." Jay Treaty, supra note 109, art.
VI. In the Treaty of Washington, the parties agreed "to consider the decision of the
commissioners as absolutely final and conclusive upon each claim decided upon by them,
and to give full effect to such decisions without any objection, evasion, or delay
whatsoever"; "to consider the result of the proceedings of this commission as a full, perfect,
and final settlement of all such claims as are mentioned in Article XII of this treaty upon
either government"; and further to treat "as finally settled, barred, and thenceforth
inadmissible" "every such claim, whether or not the same may have been presented to the
notice of, made, preferred, or laid before the said commission." Treaty of Washington,
supra note 156, arts. XIII, XVII. While Frelinghuysen v. Key makes plain that this finality
language has particular reference to the sovereign parties to the compact and that it marks
their commitment to abide by the results of the arbitration process, 110 U.S. 63, 71-72
(1884), domestic preclusion seems assumed in the discussion of the finality language of
the Convention Between the United States and Mexico, see Convention with Mexico, supra
note 122, art. V.
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was too low. 19 4 They persuaded Congress to enact legislation invoking
the then-existing reference jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.' 9 5 That
court was authorized to receive as evidence the testimony presented to
the mixed commission and any additional testimony.1 9 6 The clear assumption was that without the act of Congress the commission's award
would have been preclusive.' 97 Put differently, claims of American debtors against foreign public debtors (and at least in part private debtors
also) come with a congenital "espousal infirmity." Congress has wide latitude to provide for the resolution of these claims by arbitration panels,
without providing an alternative forum.1 98
IV.

THE PUBLIC RIGHTS DOCTRINE

In Fair Lumber Imports, the government's principal defense of the
Chapter 19 procedure rested upon the historical practice running back
to the Jay Treaty. 199 The government did, however, advance a second
line of defense, one that drew more visibly upon precedents derived from
2 00
the rise of the modern administrative state in American domestic law:
Domestic law, the government maintained, had never recognized any
"property right" in tariff or custom levels. 20 1 It then went on to argue
194. 116 U.S. 213, 214 (1886).
195. Id. at 214-15.
196. Id. at 213-14.
197. The Supreme Court entertained the suit but it held that the suit was barred by
the statute of limitations, which the act of Congress was held not to have waived. Id. at 218.
198. Cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 687 (1981) (upholding President's
power through executive agreement to provide for claims resolution); Joo v. Japan, 413
F.3d 45, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting government's ability to make treaties providing for
settlement of private claims by international tribunals). A Takings Clause claim might be
available if the arbitration panels were clearly inadequate. Settlement alone, however,
does not constitute a taking. See Abrahim-Youri v. United States, 139 F.3d 1462, 1468
(Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he fact that plaintiffs are not satisfied with the settlement negotiated
by the Government on their behalf does not entitle them to compensation by the United
States.").
199. Brief for Respondents, FairLumber Imports, supra note 106, at 23-30.
200. While the Constitution contained several provisions that could have been read to
constrain the administrative state, that did not occur. The nondelegation doctrine is no
restraint, and the administrative state's need for information has overcome any potential
barriers that might have been drawn from the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See Henry
Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 735
(1988) [hereinafter Monaghan, Stare Decisis]. My article, Marbury and the Administrative
State, is concerned with the collapse of the potential Article III barriers to administrative
adjudication. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L.
Rev. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Monaghan, Administrative State].
201. Brief for Respondents, Fair Lumber Imports, supra note 106, at 30-38 ("No one
has a legal right to the maintenance of an existing rate or duty." (quoting Norwegian
Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 318 (1933))); accord United States v.
George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 379 (1940). More generally, the petitioner was a
coalition of competitors of Canadian exporters. That sufficed for standing, but it did not
create property rights. The government pointed out that a litigant's interest in making a
profit standing alone was not a property right, citing College Savings Bank v. Florida
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that Article III was not violated because, at most, petitioner asserted only
"public" rights, as to which no right to judicial review existed, or if it did,
review did not require an Article III court. 20 2 The government did not
recognize that the mixed commission arbitration cases were themselves
simply a subtle subset of the public rights doctrine.
Professor Currie, it will be recalled, believed that BNP panels raise
no Article III difficulty because they do not exercise "the judicial power of
the United States." 20 3 This laconic statement could mean that (a) Article
III is implicated only when Article III courts are in fact employed by Congress, or (b) that although Article III presupposes that some adjudication
at the federal level can occur only in Article III courts, customs disputes
do not fall within that category. 20 4 Professor Henkin, whom Professor
Currie cites with approval, collapses both strands:
Some argued that this arrangement violates Article III establishing the Judicial power of the United States in the federal
courts . . . . The relevant provisions are properly seen as an
agreement by the United States to have some of its laws and
executive actions reviewed by an international tribunal. As
such, the agreement violates no provision of the Constitution or
any constitutional principle. Such arrangements do not entail
any delegation to an international body of legislative or judicial
power of the United States ....
The Constitution does not require that determinations of import duties be subject to review
at all, and review by an international body (rather than a U.S.
court, or no review at all), therefore, raises no constitutional issues. The arrangement seems fair and reasonable
and does not
20 5
deprive affected persons of due process of law.
This response is rather too brisk. The first sentences seem wholly conclusionary, the last two directed at a due process argument, not an argument
that Article III's very existence constrains congressional choice of adjudi20 6
catory mechanisms.
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999), cited in Brief
for Respondents, FairLumber Imports, supra note 106, at 33.
202. Brief for Respondents, Fair Lumber Imports, supra note 106, at 38-45.
203. Currie, supra note 118, at 212 n.46; see supra text accompanying note 118.
204. Currie suggested the latter conception in the preceding sentence, which begins
with "On the other hand." Currie, supra note 118, at 212 n.46. That customs disputes fall
outside of the required Article III jurisdiction is supported by case law. See, e.g., Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929) (holding that customs disputes do not "inherently
or necessarily require[ I judicial determination"); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982) (plurality opinion) (discussing public rights exception'
(citing Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 452)).
205. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 271-72 (2d ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1996) (1972). Professor Henkin also rejects a separate argument based upon
the Appointments Clause of Article II. Id.
206. The tight connection between due-process- and Article Ill-based arguments was
severed by Crowell v. Benson. 285 U.S. 22 (1932); see Monaghan, Administrative State,
supra note 200, at 17-18 ("Crowell, in sum, sanctioned a wide area for the operation of
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Article III might (at least as an original matter) have been understood to require that ifany adjudication by federal tribunals occurs, it
must occur in Article III courts. 207 The expanding national government
and the rapidly expanding national domain quickly rendered any such
conception untenable. From the very beginning, the Court recognized
"exceptions," i.e., that significant federal adjudication could occur in
non-Article III tribunals. 20 8 But not all. The very existence of Article III
has always been understood to have some restraining content on Congress. That remains true to this present day. "There is wide agreement,"
state Hart and Wechsler, "to the highly general principle that Article III
imposes at least some limits on Congress' power to vest judicial power in
non-Article III federal tribunals, but much less consensus or certainty
concerning precisely what those limits are." 20 9 Speaking specifically of
the federal judicial power, Hamilton long ago wrote, "'[tlis time only
that ...can liquidate the meaning of all the parts. '210 NAFTA is a salient
illustration of that insight.
Judicial efforts to rationalize the current reality cluster along two
lines. The first is the well established (Justice Brennan said "narrow")
"exceptions" to Article III, involving territorial courts, military tribunals,
and the adjudication of public right disputes, 211 that can, if Congress so
decides, be adjudicated in non-Article III courts. The "public rights" exception is a wide and significant one. (The extent to which these determinations can be entirely insulated from Article III review is a different
matter.) Second, a different set of authorities establishes that adjudicapublic administration, removing Article III as a meaningful barrier to the use of
administrative agencies . .. ").
207. This is not to be confused with an original understanding argument that state
courts could not entertain some categories of federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Michael G.
Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis.
L. Rev. 39, 46-135, criticized in Hart & Wechsler, supra note 154, at 437-39. Time has
wholly foreclosed that argument. For a recent illustration, see Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S.
455, 458-60 (1990) (holding that state courts can enforce federal rights of action absent
express or implied exclusion). Rather, my argument assumes that state courts could
entertain federal claims because (like Article III courts) they are sufficiently insulated from
the political branches of the national government.
208. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 78-79 (1858) (recognizing exception
for courts martial); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 283-84 (1856) (public rights); Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546
(1828) (territorial courts).
209. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 154, at 43. "The Supreme Court has struggled to
identify adjudicative functions that must remain in federal courts .... " Harold H. Bruff,
Balance of Forces: Separation of Powers Law in the Administrative State 196 (2006).
210. The Federalist No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 64, at 491. Madison, in
The Federalist No. 37, expresses the same sentiments in another context. See id. No. 37
(ames Madison), at 229.
211. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-70 (1982)
(plurality opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.); see also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 915, 920-26, 946-47 (1988) (discussing "exceptions" framework).
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tion involving many "private" rights can occur, at least initially, outside of
the Article III framework, in administrative agencies. These proceedings
are not viewed as "exceptions" to Article III, but rather as involving (with
the very greatest strain in the case of agencies) the use of "adjuncts" to
the Article III courts, much like (we are told) the traditional masters in
212
equity.
The government's reliance on Jay Treaty precedent in Fair Lumber
Imports is, at bottom, reliance upon a subset of the "public rights" exception: Espousal-based claims against foreign sovereigns have never been
thought to be within the mandatory ambit of the Article III courts, much
as money claims against the United States have always been understood
to be within the "public rights" exception to Article 111.213 Indeed, in La
Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, not mentioned by the government
in Fair Lumber Imports, the Court, in sustaining the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims to set aside an international arbitration award against
Mexico because of fraud, explicitly relied upon the public rights
21 4
doctrine.
Chapter 11, to be sure, changes the historic pattern because it permits a private litigant to invoke directly the BNP process (although not its
appeal process),215 That is an important development for private litigants, but it does not seem to me to place Chapter 11 doctrinally outside
its historic roots in the espousal cases: Absent Chapter 11, any suit by an
212. The adjunct theory stems from Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). United
States v. Raddatz, involving magistrate judges, provides a more recent and plausible
illustration. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
213. Claims against the United States for "money, lands or other things" have
historically been understood to involve public rights. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S.
438, 452 (1929). Hart & Wechsler state:
It has traditionally been understood that certain claims under federal lawnotably including those involving the sovereign immunity of the United Statespermit but do not require judicial determination. Pursuant to its Article I
powers, Congress may provide or withhold original federal jurisdiction to decide
such claims. If it so chooses, it may also provide for at least the initial
determination of such claims in federal tribunals established under Article I and
staffed by judges without the tenure and salary protections afforded to the Article
III judiciary.
Hart & Wechsler, supra note 154, at 319-20. For a comprehensive survey of the
nineteenth century precedents, see Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches,
107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 561-86 (2007).
214. 175 U.S. 423, 456 (1899); see also Exparte Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 451 & n.8 (listing
cases where Congress has power to use Article I or Article III courts); Ethan Boyer, Article
III, the Foreign Relations Power, and the Binational Panel System of NAFTA, 13 Int'l Tax
& Bus. Law. 101, 131-34 (1996) (justifying BNPs on basis of public rights doctrine).
Professor Chen, in an earlier article, reached a different conclusion. Jim C. Chen,
Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of Binational Arbitral Review Under
the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1455, 1470-72,
1497-99 (1992) (relying greatly on absence of government as party). Neither article
mentions La Abra.
215. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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American citizen against a foreign state would be barred by sovereign
21 6
immunity.
The administrative law precedents may well prove to have considerable relevance in the emerging supranational adjudicatory order. Administrative adjudication is, of course, an indispensable ingredient of the
modem administrative state, much as international arbitration proceedings are in the emerging international commercial legal order.2 17 Despite potentially formidable barriers created by Article III and the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments, the Court has long since withdrawn from any
serious effort to require Article III rather than administrative adjudication of disputes arising in the modern regulatory state. 218 The Court has,
instead, largely settled for a regime of controlled judicial supervision. 219
The agency supplies the relevant factfinding and initial law application,
and indeed, under delegation principles (including Chevron), 2 20 a signifi22 1
cant amount of the applicable substantive law.
The foregoing is true whether or not we are talking about public or
private rights. Domestically, that distinction may now have more theoretical than practical significance. Administrative Procedure Act (APA)-style
judicial review dominates the domestic legal landscape, irrespective of
216. Foreign sovereign immunity has a long history in U.S. law. See The Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (establishing general immunity for
foreign nations against suits brought by U.S. nationals). Traditionally, foreign sovereign
immunity was absolute in scope, recognizing no distinction between public and private acts
of sovereigns. See Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 573-76 (1926)
(extending immunity to commercial property of foreign sovereign). However, the modern
approach conforms to the so-called restrictive theory, according to which immunity is
extended only to public acts of sovereignty. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1602-1611 (2000)). Under either approach, the waiver of foreign sovereign immunity is a
public right.
217. See generally Monaghan, Administrative State, supra note 200 (discussing
constitutional limitations on administrative state).
218. As I have written elsewhere:
Perhaps even more importantly, though little appreciated, is the demise of the
apparent premise of several constitutional provisions-article III, the due process
clause, and the jury trial provisions of the sixth and seventh amendments-that
most adjudication implementing national regulatory policy would occur before
judicial tribunals. This premise failed to prevent extensive administrative
determination of the rights and duties created by the modern state.
Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 200, at 735 (footnotes omitted).
219. "[T]he Supreme Court is not anxious to reclaim for the courts the business they
have lost to administrative agencies over the years." Bruff, supra note 209, at 201.
220. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Justice Scalia's insistence that lawmaking cannot be delegated is a fiction apparent even to
the untutored. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-75 (2001).
221. "The court's task is to fix the boundaries of delegated authority, an inquiry that
includes defining the range of permissible criteria .... [T] he judicial role is to specify what
the statute cannot mean, and some of what it must mean, but not all that it does mean."
Monaghan, Administrative State, supra note 200, at 27.
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the nature of the "right" involved. 222 But the "public-private rights" distinction has a potential importance in foreign judicial review cases. That
distinction provides considerable support for the emerging supranational
adjudicatory order.
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,223 relied upon in
La Abra, still remains the fountainhead for the modern public rights doctrine. 2 24 There, an executive official had imposed a summary attachment
on the assets of the customs collector for the port of New York after auditing his accounts. 2 25 The account had been found deficient by the rather
startling sum of one million three hundred thousand dollars, and a distress warrant issued creating a lien on the collector's real property. 226
The validity of a subsequent property transfer pursuant to a lien foreclosure proceeding depended upon the validity of the summary attachment
proceedings. 22 7 After disposing of a due process challenge, 228 the Court
turned to Article III. Justice Curtis acknowledged that the auditing "may
be, in an enlarged sense, a judicial act." 229 He continued: "So are all
those administrative duties the performance of which involves an inquiry
230
into the existence of facts and the application to them of rules of law."
But such an acknowledgement did not necessarily implicate Article III's
'Judicial power." Justice Curtis began with an important reservation: "To
avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it proper to state
that we do not consider congress can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the
common law, or in equity, or admiralty .... ,,231 But he then advised:
222. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
223. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855); see Nelson, supra note 213, at 586-90 (discussing
Murray's Lessee and public rights exception for taxation).
224. La Abra invoked that decision in its public rights discussion. See La Abra Silver
Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 456 (1899).
225. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 274.
226. Id. at 275.
227. Id.
228. Reviewing historical practice, the Court concluded, "We apprehend there has
been no period, since the establishment of the English monarchy, when there has not
been, by the law of the land, a summary method for the recovery of debts due to the crown,
and especially those due from receivers of the revenues." Id. at 277. "It is certain that this
diversity in 'the law of the land' between public defaulters and ordinary debtors was
understood in this country, ...
before the formation of the constitution of the United
States." Id. at 278.
229. Id. at 280.

230. Id.
231. Id. at 284. "But these claims are false, aren't they? Territorial courts frequently
entertain common law and equity actions, and the suit in Canter was one in admiralty."
Hart & Wechsler, supra note 154, at 380 (discussing American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)). This is an overstatement. Canter, for example, quite clearly
assumed that admiralty proceedings in the states could occur only in Article III courts. 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) at 546 ("[Aldmiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the states .. . only [in
courts] which are established in pursuance of the 3d article of the Constitution.").
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[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of 2 the courts of the United States, as it may deem
23
proper.
This set in motion a doctrine that civil disputes between private parties
and the government-many cases of which seemingly call for strongly independent adjudicators 2 3 3 -can be withdrawn entirely from the Article
III courts and assigned for determination either to Article I courts, or to
executive and administrative agencies. 234 If the Article III courts do participate, as is commonly the case, no general Article III problem exists in
limiting the judicial role to something less than de novo examination of
the matter. (In short, the judicial role can be confined to the review now
provided in Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act 23 5 and perhaps even more narrowly.)
What is striking about Murray's Lessee is less its holding than its vintage: 1855. This was an era of a small, relatively invisible, national government. 236 Jacksonian democracy (with its distrust of legislatures) and
negative government were taking firm hold, both politically and judicially, and litigation involving private parties and the government was
pretty much an outlier in the judicial mind. No member of the Murray's
Lessee Court could have imagined the modern administrative state with its
vast regulatory and spending operations. But the decision provided an
important foundation for judicial efforts to come to grips with the emerging industrial order. The Court's emphasis on the importance of "private
23 7
rights" made good contemporary sense. The Lochner line of case law,
condemning redistributive legislation, involved private rights: governmental efforts at establishing or altering the "private" rights of A against
B. As judicial hostility to this kind of legislation waned, 23 8 however, the
232. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
233. This is particularly true of coercive actions for "civil" penalties by the government
against individuals. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 154, at 370. Some form of APA-type
review is, however, the norm. E.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455-56 (1977) (allowing Congress to assign adjudication of
public rights to agency, although noting agency determination is subject to judicial
review); see also Nelson, supra note 213, at 602-05 (discussing Atlas Roofing and expansion
of public rights doctrine).
234. See the lucid summary by Justice Van Devanter in Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279
U.S. 438, 449-51 (1929).
235. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
236. This decision comes long before the emergence of the modern, bureaucratic,
national government.
237. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905) (holding unconstitutional
under Fourteenth Amendment New York laws limiting hours for bakers).
238. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 520, 539 (1934) (rejecting equal
protection and due process challenges to state regulation of milk prices).
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Court became more appreciative of the need for a system of shared adju23 9
dication between agencies and Article III courts.
In light of current perceptions of what makes sense, the public-private rights doctrine has produced some results that are not readily
defensible.
" In suits between private parties, Article III courts, not administrative
agencies, probably must (if the parties insist) be used for the resolution
of common law claims of A against B.240 Congress could, of course,
24 2
eliminate this jurisdiction, 24 1 and some believe that it should.
" Crowell v. Benson established that most private right claims between A
and B created by Congress in the administrative state can be subject to
initial administrative adjudication, with some APA-style Article III review thereafter. 243 Moreover, the public rights exception has been significantly enlarged so as to absorb much of what hitherto had fallen
into the private rights domain. Two decisions, both written by Justice
O'Connor, seemed to have effectively discarded the distinction altogether in favor of an open-ended, wholly unstructured balancing approach. 244 Then, Justice Brennan revived the general doctrine with a
reformulated content:
In our most recent discussion of the "public rights" doctrine...
we rejected the view that "a matter of public right must at a minimum arise 'between the government and others."' ... The crucial question, in cases not involving the Federal Government, is
whether "Congress . . . [has] create[d] a seemingly 'private'
right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme
239. Once the new regulatory order was sustained, considerations such as the volume
and variety of adjudications, administrative expertise, etc. took hold in legitimating the
new adjudicatory order. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 154, at 371.
240. This statement is necessarily of a qualified nature. Compare N. Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 (1982) ("Our precedents clearly establish
that only controversies in the [public rights] category may be removed from Art. III courts
and delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies for their determination."),
with Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854 (1986) ("[W]here
private, common law rights are at stake, our examination of the congressional attempt to
control the manner in which those rights are adjudicated has been searching.").
241. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) ("Congress may withhold
from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies.").
242. The current debate over the utility of diversity jurisdiction is discussed in Hart &
Weschler, supra note 154, at 1498-503. This jurisdiction remains an important staple of
district court jurisdiction in the "real" world, particularly in the great commercial centers
such as New York. For me, perhaps the last of the old order, the heart of a course in
federal courts is what Henry Hart taught me: the law applied by district courts in civil
litigation.
243. 285 U.S. 22, 50-52 (1932).
244. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (stating that for encroachment on Article III
jurisdiction "the Court has declined to adopt formalistic and unbending rules"); Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589-91 (1985) (engaging in open-ended
review to determine that challenged arbitration scheme does not violate Article III).
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with limited
as to be a matter appropriate for agency '24resolution
5
involvement by the Article III judiciary.
Justice Scalia may be the last of the Old Believers in insisting that the
public rights doctrine is inapplicable unless the government itself is a
party to the litigation. 24 6 Effectively, therefore, every right created by
the administrative state can be initially adjudicated outside the framework of an Article III court-at least if it does not too closely resemble
a common law right.
Finally, the public rights doctrine, however capacious, does not extend
to most criminal prosecution. 24 7 Thus, coercive governmental actions
against defendants arising out of the same transaction can be subject to
initial administrative adjudication, if a civil penalty is sought, but not if
4
a criminal penalty is.2 8
As many writers have observed, the existing doctrine produces some
anomalies. In cases in which an independent, life-tenured Article III
judge would seem to be quite vital, namely, cases of extrajudicial coercion
by the government against private individuals, administrative agencies
can serve as, at least, the initial adjudicators, except in criminal prosecutions. By contrast, where the need for Article III independence now
seems far less central, namely, cases involving private right claims by A
against B under a valid regulatory scheme, participation of an Article III
court seems mandatory if the adjudication occurs at the federal level.
Ex parte Bakelite Corp. long ago applied public rights doctrine to hold
that customs disputes could be conclusively assigned to executive officials
or legislative courts for final resolution. 249 While existing case law thus
bodes well for the emerging supranational adjudicatory order in trade
disputes, NAFTA could provide an occasion to reexamine the entire jurisprudence of the public-private rights distinction. Bowing first to the imperatives of the administrative state and then to the emerging transnational adjudicatory order, one might concede that civil adjudication can
occur at least initially, and sometimes entirely, outside the framework of
Article III courts with only narrow, historically explained exceptions.
Whether one should discard the public-private rights doctrine as the ex245. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989) (citations omitted)
(quoting N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69; Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 593-94).
246. See id. at 70 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I would return to the longstanding
principle that the public rights doctrine requires, at a minimum, that the United States be
a party to the adjudication.").
247. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70 n.24 ("Of course, the public-rights doctrine does not
extend to any criminal matters, although the Government is a proper party."); cf. Palmore
v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (sustaining prosecution for "local" District of
Columbia crime before non-Article III court).
248. Compare N. Pipeline,458 U.S. at 69-71 (noting public rights doctrine does not
extend to criminal matters), with Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 (1977) (allowing administrative agency adjudication of
civil money penalty). This is, of course, not to deny that violation of an administrative
order can be made a criminal offense.
249. 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929).
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planatory framework is another matter, however. The distinction is a familiar one, and if it can be made to fit the dominant reality in the vast
majority of cases it probably should be retained, even if it has some
ragged edges. No obvious replacement exists. Justice O'Connor's "balancing" approach 2 50 to the constraints imposed by Article III has no capacity to specify the relevant variables with any precision or to determine
how they should be weighed. In any event, the distinction between public and private rights wholly disposes of the challenge in FairLumber Imports. The petitioner was not asserting any "property right" in the tariff
rates, at least as the term has been historically understood. And if, as
competitors, the petitioner did have any right, it was surely a "public" one
which did not require an Article III court.
The "public rights" exception has another important feature in international adjudication. The rhetoric is that these can be withdrawn entirely
from any Article III scrutiny.25 1 But domestically rhetoric has not
matched reality. Hart and Wechsler suggest that no complete withdrawal
cases exist domestically. 2 52 NAFTA provides an example of complete
withdrawal-and that may have the endorsement of Hart and Wechsler's
learned authors. They suggest that any constitutional question in the international context should not "be analyzed in the same way... [as] in a
purely domestic context."253 Of course, those opposed to the emerging
order would agree, but they would invalidate much of the new adjudica254
tory order.
V. REVISITING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Historical practice and the rise of the public rights doctrine will, I
believe, play an important role in assessing the legitimacy of the emerging supranational adjudicatory order. But they do not exhaust the category of relevant variables, and a second look at some of what has been
discussed is appropriate.
250. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
251. See Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 457-58 (stating that disposition of public rights
matters is within congressional control and applying this to customs and duties).
252. As the casebook suggests:
[T]he legal background has always included a range of common law and
equitable remedies against government officers, who are often suable in their
own names, even when the public rights and sovereign immunity doctrines bar
unconsented suit against the government itself. Historically, this tradition of
"officer suits" has diminished, but by no means eradicated, the tension between
the public fights category on the one hand and, on the other, the ideal of the
rule of the law and the dictum of Marbury v. Madison promising a legal remedy for
every deprivation of a legal right.
Hart & Wechsler, supra note 154, at 370-71 (citations omitted).
253. Id. at 403. An argument based on a constitutional federalism premise that state
procedural default rules cannot be displaced by the Convention is an argument directed at
the scope of the Treaty power, not the adjudicatory mechanism it sets up.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 45-51.
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A. NAFTA BNPs
While Chapter 11 and 19 proceedings are in the mold first established by the Jay Treaty, they push beyond the traditional format. Chapter 11 dispenses with the necessity of espousal; it provides for an investorstate, not state-state, proceeding. 255 Professor Bjorklund describes the
change, discussing both its benefits and drawbacks:
Ad hoc investment arbitration offers manifold advantages to investors. Earlier claims commissions were technically government-to-government dispute settlement. An aggrieved alien was
represented by his country of origin, rather than representing
himself. In contrast, in entering investment treaties, the United
States and other countries have permitted foreign investors to
bring claims directly against the government in whose territory
they are investing. This change accords with the purpose of the
treaties: to increase the certainty and predictability of dispute
resolution should there be a problem with the investment that is
the fault of the government and a violation of international law.
It means, however, that an important filtering mechanism is no
longer in place: aliens do not need to convince their own countries to espouse their claims but may themselves commence
2 56
arbitration.
A Chapter 19 state-state proceeding charges the BNP with directly reviewing the application of the domestic American law ofjudicial review, albeit
nominally in a manner akin to APA-type review. 2 57 Chapter 11, of course,
does not formally provide for such direct review over the national courts,
and Chapter 11 BNPs routinely disclaim any such "appellate" jurisdiction. 258 As Loewen Group explained:
The Tribunal is concerned with domestic law only to the extent
that it throws light on the [NAFTA] issues in dispute and pro255. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
256. Bjorklund, supra note 6, at 831 (footnote omitted).
257. Moreover, it requires federal officials to take direct action to comply with the
specific BNP determinations. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904. The WTO also requires
only that the United States bring its law in compliance with the arbitration ruling, but if
the United States does not, only sanctions are imposed. See Marrakesh Understanding,
supra note 43, art. 22.
258. See Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 182, 216 (NAFrA Ch.
11 Arb. Trib. 2002) ("On the approach adopted by Mondev, NAFTA tribunals would turn
into courts of appeal, which is not their role."); Azinian v. United Mexican States, 5 ICSID
(W. Bank) 269, 290 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998) ("The possibility of holding a State
internationally liable for judicial decisions does not, however, entitle a claimant to seek
international review of the national court decisions as though the international jurisdiction
seised has plenary appellate jurisdiction. This is not true generally, and it is not true for
NAFTA."); see also Ahdieh, supra note 13, at 2047-49 (reviewing powers of Chapter 11
tribunals and concluding "[g]iven the seeming inconsistency of Chapter 11 with appellate
review, it should come as little surprise that Chapter 11 panels have repeatedly rejected any
conception of themselves as courts of appeal."). In both Loewen Group and Mondev, the
ultimate claim (at least in theory) was not that the state court got the state law "wrong," but
rather that its conduct denied rights secured by the treaty to foreign investors.
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vides domestic avenues of redress for matters of which Claimants complain. The Tribunal cannot under the guise of a
what is in substance an appeal from a
NAIFTA claim entertain
25 9
domestic judgment.
The formal differences between Chapter 11 and 19 are easily overstated. In both Mondev and Loewen Group, the Chapter 11 BNP, like the
Chapter 19 BNP, formally asserted limited review over the American decisionmakers. 260 In fact, in both schemes American proceedings came
under very close review. 26 1 Indeed, such intense review is necessarily
built into the scheme. BNPs are, after all, one-shot arbitrators with a sin26 2
gle-minded focus: the state court decision.
And so, where does this leave us? The United States has entered a
trade agreement with its neighbors that guarantees that foreign investors
will not fall victim to uncompensated expropriation and other wrongs,
including a denial ofjustice by domestic courts, as well as unfair competition by way of tariffs and subsidies. No "right" of a successful American
litigant is implicated. Nor is any "right" of the United States itself at issue;
it, after all, has entered the trade agreement for eminently comprehensible purposes, which include binational rather than domestic dispute resolution. And it is far too late in the day to argue that the arbitration process is "forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of
263
the Tenth Amendment."
In the end, therefore, what is at stake in both Chapter 11 and 19 is
not the "loss" of state Article III authority under NAFTA (and the WTO),
but the loss of national (both federal and state) judicial authority. But
why is the substitution of supranational for national adjudication of concern to the American constitutional order so long as the legal rights of
American nationals are not at stake? The historical practice from the Jay
Treaty on down shows that such a dispute resolution framework does not
259. Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) 421, 450 (NAIFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib. 2003).
260. Id.; Mondev, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) at 215.
261. Loewen Group, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) at 450; Mondeu, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) at 227.
Ernest Young is quite right to say that, in Mondev, the panel's disclaimer notwithstanding,
the Supreme Judicial Court's decision was subject to close inspection as to whether it had
seriously misapplied its precedents. Young, supra note 9, at 1173 (describing panel review
as "pretty searching"). Professor Bjorklund endorses such an approach:
This Article suggests that such tribunals engage in a sequential review. Under
sequential review, the tribunal should first determine whether the challenged
judicial practice in a particular case departed from national law so markedly that
it denied justice to the alien. If it did not, the tribunal would secondly measure
the challenged judicial practice or the national law itself against international law.
Bjorklund, supra note 6, at 815; see also id. at 873-78 (expanding on how tribunals should
review compliance with domestic law under sequential review).
262. The focus could be elsewhere-on state executive and administrative officialsbut it would still be single-minded.
263. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920) (rejecting such a proposal with
respect to treaty power).
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contravene the essential attributes of the judicial power as they have been
historically understood. But if one varies the practice described, Article
III (and federalism) concerns become far more visible. 264 Suppose, for
example, that (pursuant to statute) the United States sought reimbursement from any state whose courts had caused a NAFTA violative expropriation, or indeed, from the prevailing litigant in the state court (on the
ground that the litigant [at least temporarily] had been unjustly enriched). Or, suppose that in suits between private litigants, as in Mondev,
Congress authorized direct review in a supranational tribunal from a decision of the Supreme Court or the highest state court on NAFITA-based
claims. 26 5 One can surely expect that courts like the "supreme Court"
would bristle at any such thought! Could the "supreme Court" itself be
the object of treaty-based process? More realistically, perhaps, suppose
Congress simply mandated a stay of judicial proceedings while a litigant
sought a ruling from an appropriate supranational tribunal, a ruling
266
which would then (ordinarily) be given preclusive effect.
Chapter 19 proceedings increase Article III concerns. Here, the federal agency must act in compliance with the NAFTA decisions. 26 7 But is
264. One might say at the outset that any supposed variations that overtly threaten
national judicial authority will "never" occur because of internal political constraints. For
the near future that may very well hold true. But the variations themselves raise issues
more difficult than the pattern that surprised Chief Justice Marshall. See supra text
accompanying notes 1-3.
265. Distinctions, close ones perhaps, must be made here. The United States, like any
private litigant, can waive the benefit of defenses, including claim preclusion. Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 154, at 104-05.
266. In certain limited circumstances, a state party may request review of a panel
decision by an extraordinary challenge committee. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(13).
The three committee members are selected by a process similar to that of the binational
panel. However, an incorrect application of domestic countervailing duty law is not
necessarily a basis for overturning a panel decision if the circumstances do not meet
specific enumerated criteria: The Party must establish (i) that a panel member was guilty
of material misconduct, (ii) that the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of
procedure, or (iii) that the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, such as by failing to apply
the appropriate standard of review. See id. art. 1904(13) (a). In addition, the Party must
show that the violation "has materially affected the panel's decision and threatens the
integrity of the binational panel review process." Id. art. 1904(13)(b). The few
extraordinary committees that have convened have all affirmed panel decisions. See, e.g.,
In re Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Can., 1991 WL 153112, at *9 (U.S.-Can. F.T.A.
Ch. 19 Extraordinary Challenge Comm'n, June 14, 1991) (rejecting extraordinary
challenge because state failed to meet standards set under U.S.-Can. F.T.A., supra note
181, art. 1904(13), which were substantially the same as NAFTA standards under art.
1904(13)).
267. Congress, it should be noted, was fully aware that this enactment might pose
constitutional problems, and it sought to provide a "fallback" mechanism to deal with the
issue if Chapter 19 ran afoul of the Constitution. The fallback provision would permit the
President to accept the panel's decision as his own. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (g) (7) (B)
(2000). In Section 3 of Executive Order 12,662, 3 C.F.R. 624 (1988), reprinted as
amended in 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note at 426 (2000), President Ronald Reagan stated that if
the fallback mechanism takes effect pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g) (7) (B), "I accept, as a
whole, all decisions of binational panels and extraordinary challenge committees."
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the latter feature of constitutional moment? At oral argument in Fair
Lumber Imports the Court picked up on petitioners' suggestion that none
of the precedents involved foreign judicial review of a suit "won" by an
American citizen against the American government. 268 The government
responded, quite correctly in my view, that this misdescribed the proceeding-that the litigation was a suit by Canada against the United States in
which the American citizens happened to agree with the views of the
American government. 269 Moreover, the government pointed out that it
was not the BNP that extracted obedience by federal officials to its deci2 70
sion, it was the NAFTA Implementation Act that did.
To me, there seems to be little significant difference between a remedial scheme, such as Chapter 19, in which Congress requires immediate
obedience from specific officials and ones like Chapter 11 and the WTO
where the preclusive effect of the arbitration award means that penalties
can be assessed if the United States fails to undertake corrective steps to
bring its (impermissible) substantive law into compliance. This seems especially true because the Chapter 19 BNP has no power itself to compel
obedience to its determinations.
B. Sanchez-Llamas
In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court filtered the significance of the
ICJjudgment through the background mindset of Marbury.2 71 The result
was no more than "respectful consideration." 272 Would the interpretive
issues have seemed different had the Court thought that the relevant
background principle was the public rights doctrine? More importantly,
is Sanchez-Llamas beyond congressional correction because of Marburybased concerns? While the topic is too large to consider fully here,
Medellin presents the strongest case in which to consider the issue. 27 3 UnPresident Bill Clinton stated the same in Executive Order 12,889, 3 C.F.R. 707 (1994),
reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 3311 note at 664-65. Neither Executive Order has been repealed.
The constitutionality of the fallback provision and of implementing executive orders were
also challenged in FairLumber Imports. See Complaint, FairLumber Imports, supra note 41,
at 6-7; see also Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 303 (2007) (discussing
constitutionality of fallback provisions generally).
268. Transcript, Fair Lumber Imports, supra note 182, at 25; see supra text
accompanying notes 41-42.
269. Transcript, FairLumber Imports, supra note 182 at 25-26.
270. Id. at 28; see supra text accompanying notes 184-187. At this point in the oral
argument the court wondered whether there were limits on the extent to which Congress
could order the President to comply with the mandates of foreign tribunals. Transcript,
FairLabor Imports, supra note 182, at 28-29. In an inconclusive exchange, the government
submitted that there might be such limits, but they were not involved in this situationthat this was simply a time-honored commercial arbitration. Id. at 29-30. Practice and the
effect of ordering compliance were no different from giving the judgment preclusive
effect.
271. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006).
272. Id. at 2685.
273. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005).
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like the Sanchez-Llamas petitioners, Medellin's claim had been espoused
by Mexico in Avena. 2 74 Why wasn't the judgment entitled to real defer275
ence (indeed, preclusive effect) on the meaning of the Convention?
The power to enter treaties subsumes the power to establish tribunals for
their interpretation. The idea of judicial deference is certainly not alien
to the Court in the foreign law context. There are numerous (albeit by
no means an unbroken line of) decisions in which deference has been
given to the President's construction of treaty obligations. 27 6 In judicial
decisions enforcing foreign judgments in private rights cases, as Justice
Ginsburg points oUt, 2 7 7 the merits of the foreign judgment are not reexamined de novo. This fact is also reflected in the enforcement of foreign
278
arbitration awards under the "New York Convention."
To be sure, completely bypassing Article III courts in favor of international tribunals, as in the NAFTA regime, is one thing; according their
adjudications preclusive effect in a domestic proceeding in an Article III
court is quite another. 2 79 But the individual rights established by the
Vienna Convention-even if assumed to exist (as the Court did in
Sanchez-Llamas)-are, at best, only "public rights," and I submit that fact
274. Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
275. The fact that the United States was a party should alone be sufficient to establish
the effect of the ruling for entities and citizens within the United States.
276. See Medellin, 544 U.S. at 685-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("When called upon
to interpret a treaty in a given case or controversy, we give considerable weight to the
Executive Branch's understanding of our treaty obligations." (citing Kolovrat v. Oregon,
366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913))).
277. See id. at 670-71 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments); sources cited supra note 71. This general doctrine is
of ancient vintage. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 350 (1854) (explaining
that "mere error of judgment" was not basis for refusing to recognize arbitration award).
The classic examination of the issue is, of course, Justice Horace Gray's opinion in Hilton
v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 162-203 (1895).
278. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. The treaty is codified in U.S. law
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2000). See Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International
Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 Va. J. Int'l L. 675, 700-15 (2003), for a
description of the deference paid by federal courts to the rulings of international tribunals.
Still, permitting private parties to "contract out" of Article III has never been deemed to
create the problem that permitting government agents to bar Article III review would.
Compare, e.g., Ry. Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 285-87 (1871)
(preventing state legislature from barring Article III review), with Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1972) (allowing parties to contract for foreign court
adjudication).
279. The canonical exploration of this dichotomy is, of course, Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, which,
among other things, posited a distinction between bypassing those courts and limiting
their jurisdiction when acting as an enforcement court or a court in the position of an
enforcement court. 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1372-74 (1953). 1 have suggested that the
crucial distinction is between bypassing those courts and utilizing them, whether or not
acting as enforcement courts. See Monaghan, Administrative State, supra note 200, at
22-24.
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is not altered because their principal relevance is in a criminal proceeding (a classic illustration of the private rights model).280 Given the long
history of international dispute resolution, and the time-sanctioned doctrine of public rights, it is difficult to believe that deference to the ICJ
judgment would have compromised the essential attributes of the judicial
power.

28 1

CONCLUSION

Existing case law establishes that the emerging international commercial arbitration world does not compromise contemporary understandings of "the essential attributes of the judicial power." On the other
hand, we have at present no satisfactory account of the nature of those
"essential attributes," or the extent to which these attributes are constitutionally protected against congressional alteration. This is not surprising.
The difficulty begins with the 1789 text itself, which can be read to give
Congress unlimited power over the jurisdiction of federal courts, that is,
Congress can use those tribunals or ignore them. But that reading of the
text has never reflected our actual understanding. 28 2 Article III's very
existence has always exerted a strong gravitational pull, both politically as
well as legally. The existence of these courts has always been perceived to
be indispensable to the legitimacy of our constitutional authority. Nonetheless, the history of ourjurisprudence governing the rise of the modern
administrative state demonstrates that the factfinding and law-application
280. Statements that Article III guarantees the structural integrity of the federal
courts in the American scheme of government by not enforcing "unexamined" decisions of
other tribunals cannot be understood in a sweeping fashion. Contra Fallon, supra note
211, at 950-70 (discussing public rights doctrine and noting that while it poses a challenge
to argument for appellate review by Article III courts, it is not an "insuperable
impediment" to that position).
281. Sanchez is not an enforcement proceeding within the traditional understanding.
The ICJ judgment is not a predicate for federal judicial enforcement of duties against
Sanchez; rather, he seeks a benefit based upon the ICJ interpretation of the Convention.
Where an American litigant in a domestic proceeding is seeking the benefit of a favorable
treaty or international judgment, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will feel any
imperative that the federal courts must independently determine that such a benefit exists.
Burdens present more difficult issues. Historically, American law has been concerned
about judicial review of governmental imposition of burdens on American residents. For
example, it was understood quite early that litigants had standing to complain about
deprivations of either liberty or property, at least as that term was understood in the
common law. See Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 334-49 (1965).
However these questions are resolved, they are not involved in the Vienna Convention
cases. The concept of what constitutes a "burden" has shifted over time. In his great
dialogue, Henry Hart very perceptively suggested, in 1953, that government entitlement
programs might be viewed as triggering a burden analysis when deprivations had occurred.
Hart, supra note 279, at 1386. In that respect, he anticipated Charles Reich's very well
known essay on the "new property." Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733
(1964).
282. "Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and
control." Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
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functions of the district courts (except in criminal and common law trials) can be curtailed. But one important systemic role for the Article III
courts remains: the power to confine other organs of government within
the bounds of their authority. 28 3 If NAFTA-like arbitration processes
compromise that function, they do so only at the margin. 284 Far more
important issues for our constitutional order are raised by the delegation
of lawmaking authority to international bodies. Issues of national sovereignty and democratic accountability are surely raised by this increasingly
widespread practice. But that bell having been rung, it cannot be
unrung.
Nor in the area of international trade should it be. That trade has a
long-standing interest to the United States, and continued participation
in international trade is now being significantly affected by the new supranational institutions. Necessarily, such a development challenges our
own constitutional understandings, such as delegation of legislative powers. But given the decision of the representatives of the American people
to participate in the new economic order, the large role that the United
States plays in shaping the new institutions, our own vast economic
power, and the ultimate prerogative of the political branches to withdraw
from any supranational institution, I find it difficult to endorse, in limine,
any categorical prohibition barring our full participation in these new
institutions.
283. Monaghan, Administrative State, supra note 200, at 31-34.
284. At oral argument in FairLumber Imports, the petitioner conceded that the BNP
decision, while authoritative for the litigants, had no precedential effect. Transcript, Fair
Lumber Imports, supra note 182, at 21 ("I don't believe they're precedent, but ... they are
clearly authoritative . . . [i]n the case at hand.").

